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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Exit and Voice 
The concept pair "voice" and "exit" from Prof. Albert O. Hirschman's 1970 volume, Exit, Voice 
and Loyalty,
1 are standard categories for discussing the options of shareholders confronted with poorly 
managed stock corporations.
2  Prof. Hirschman's analysis shows how a participant in a relationship 
                                                 
*   Research Associate, Institute for Law and Finance, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt am 
Main. J.D., Georgetown University, Ph.D., SUNY at Buffalo, LL.M University of Frankfurt. 
1   Albert O. Hirschman, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, 
AND STATES (1970). 
2   See  e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr.,  Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate 
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of 
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, footnote 25 (1991); Bernard S. Black, Agents Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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will, if discontent, either voice concerns or exit the relationship.  Exit is an "economics" solution, while 
voice is a "political" solution.
3  The action a participant tends to take is greatly determined by the 
nature of a given relationship, and voice and exit tend to be inversely related.
4  Where high barriers to 
exit are combined with free use of voice, such as in a family, the use of voice increases and that of exit 
decreases.
5  Where free exit is combined with high barriers to the successful use of voice, such as in a 
relationship between a consumer and the mass producer of a commonly available product, the use of 
exit increases.
6  Loyalty, such as family ties, patriotism or brand loyalty can countervail the tendency 
to exit.
7  Voice is generally more expensive than exit, and thus may be used less when interests are 
split up and diversified, which would require the exercise of voice in a number of different places,
8 but 
voice has the valuable effect of creating a public good by affecting the environment in which the 
specific organization operates.
9  Thus, in the case of a shareholder, voice may improve not only her 
corporation (private good), but the entire market (public good) in which the corporation is active, and 
while it is possible to exit from a deteriorating corporation, it may not be possible to exit from the 
market that suffers from such corporation's failure.
10 
In the corporate setting, a shareholder can react to deteriorating performance by using voting 
rights or litigation to try to change the course of the management (voice) or by selling out (exit). As 
exit corresponds to sale, its exercise is facilitated through the development of liquid and efficient 
                                                                                                                                                 
Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39  UCLA L. R EV. 811, footnote 6 
(1992): Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 
84 GEO. L.J. 1 (1995); EILÍS FERRAN, COMPANY LAW AND CORPORATE FINANCE 239 (1999). 
3   HIRSCHMAN, supra note 1, at 15-17.  
4   "[T]he decision whether to exit will often be taken in the light of the prospects for the effective use of 
voice. If customers are sufficiently convinced that voice will be effective, then they may well postpone 
exit." Id. at 37. 
5   Id. at 33. 
6   "The availability to consumers of the exit option, and their frequent resort to it, are characteristic of 
'normal' (non-perfect) competition, where the firm has competitors but enjoys some latitude as both 
price-maker and quality-maker – and therefore, in the latter capacity, also as  a quality-spoiler. As 
already mentioned, the exit option is widely held to be uniquely powerful: by inflicting revenue losses 
on delinquent management."  Id. at 21. 
7   "[T]he extent to which customer-members are willing to trade off the certainty of exit against the 
uncertainties of an improvement in the deteriorated product . . . . is clearly related to that special 
attachment to an organization known as loyalty. . . . As a rule, then, loyalty holds exit at bay and 
activates voice."  Id. at 77-78. 
8   Id. at 40. 
9   Id. at 101. 
10   "If I disagree with an organization, say, a political party, I can resign as a member, but generally I 
cannot stop being a member of the society in which the objectionable party functions. . . . the 
individual is at first both producer and consumer of such public goods as party politics . . . he can stop 
being producer, but cannot stop being consumer." Id. at 102. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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securities markets and, for privately held companies, appraisal rights.
11  Exit disciplines management 
by driving down the company's share price and increasing its cost of raising capital.  The message sent 
by exit is, however, semantically generic; it communicates to the market that something could be 
wrong, but does not specify what.
12  Exit also provides no guarantee that the new owner of the shares 
will take measures to correct the original problem, which can augment the public good problem 
referred to above.  This means, from the perspective of a market regulator and the economy as a 
whole, that use of exit as an exclusive remedy could increase the number of avoidable corporate 
failures and reduce market efficiency.
13  As voice in this context corresponds to voting or litigation, it 
is promoted by rules that facilitate the use of communication to defend shareholder rights.
14  A number 
of such rules have developed over time.  The ability to grant proxies, for example, which was 
forbidden at common law, has become a way of increasing the power of voice by allowing it to be 
exercised in absentee and, in a proxy contest, focusing it through a single, well-informed channel.
15  
This right is augmented by the ability to obtain a copy of the stockholders' list for the purposes of 
                                                 
11   See  Thompson,  supra  note 2, at 3 - 4 .  Therefore, the enormous undertaking in market regulation 
performed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Association of Securities Dealers 
and the New York Stock Exchange, among others, has served to make the exit option more practical 
for shareholders. 
12   It is also true that the sale of stock is less communicative of possible non-public information than is a 
purchase of stock, for although market participants often are in need of liquidity they are less often 
under pressure to invest immediately in a particular security.  See  Steve Thel,  $850,000 in Six 
Minutes—The Mechanics of Securities Manipulation, 79  CORNELL  L. R EV. 219, 242 (1994), with 
further citations. 
13   See  Remarks of Lawrence E. Harris, SEC Chief Economist, in "Unofficial Transcript of SEC 
Roundtable on Proposed Security Holder Director Nominations Rules" (Mar. 10, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/transcript03102004.txt. 
14   Shareholders of corporations generally have rights that have been traditionally been categorized in: 
"(1) Rights as to control and management; (2) proprietary rights; (3) remedial and ancillary rights."  
HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATION 375 (1946).  These rights are found in 
contemporary corporate law statues such as the Delaware General Corporation Law (Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 8) and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA). The rights as to control and 
management are mainly voting rights that may be exercised in various circumstances (Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 8, §§ 212, 211(b), 242(b), 251(c), 271, 275(c); §§ 7.21(a), 7.28, 8.08, 9.21, 9.52, 10.03, 10.20, 
11.04, 12.02, 14.02 RMBCA).  The proprietary rights are primarily rights to share pro rata in dividend 
payments ( see, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §   151(c); § 6.01(c)(3) RMBCA) and payouts upon 
liquidation of the corporation (Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 151(d); § 6.01(b)(2) RMBCA).  The remedial 
and ancillary rights include the right to bring a derivative suit (Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 327; § 7.01 
RMBCA) and the right to inspect corporate books and records (Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220; §§ 16.02, 
16.04, 16.20 RMBCA).  See also ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 13 (1986); JAMES D. 
COX, T HOMAS  LEE  HAZEN  & F. H ODGE  O'NEAL, C ORPORATIONS §   13.1 (2002), and  FRANKLIN  A 
GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 179, 195, 210, 387 (2000).  
15   "Corporate practice has come a long way from the common law's nonrecognition of the proxy device. 
The widespread distribution of corporate securities, with the concomitant separation of ownership and 
management, puts the entire concept of the stockholder' meeting at the mercy of the proxy instrument. 
This makes the corporate proxy a tremendous force for good or evil in our economic scheme."  LOUIS 
LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 6-C-1 (3
rd ed., 2004). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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running a proxy contest.
16  A recent enhancement of voice has been the creation of organizations that 
analyze company information and make recommendations to shareholders on the exercise of voting 
rights, such as Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS).
17  This reduces each individual 
shareholder's cost of analyzing company information and thus reduces the tendency towards so-called 
rational apathy.
18  Well-known tools for increasing the ability of a shareholder to use judicial action 
are the shareholder's derivative suit, the class action, and contingency fees.
19  Exit and voice can also 
be combined.  Corporate tender offers present a two-step mechanism in which the shareholders of a 
target corporation exit by selling their shares to a bidder, who then uses a voice strengthened through 
the aggregation of the purchased voting rights to replace current management.
20 
B. The Opponents of Shareholder Voice 
The governance structure of the stock corporation as it exists under U.S. state statutes displays 
significant characteristics of a representative democracy.
21  The structure allows capital and expertise 
to be accumulated in the hands of experienced corporate directors (the representatives), and the right to 
vote provides not only legitimacy,
22 but also a flexibility that allows the structure to adapt to new 
circumstances.
23  Like  democracy, this structure began its road to modern prominence in the 17
th 
century, and depends to a great extent on the free decisions of numerous individuals to unite in a 
common cause.
24  Like democracy, shareholder voice is far from perfect, and has opponents who focus 
                                                 
16   See, e.g., RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS 
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL § 3.01 (3
rd ed., 1998); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220; Shamrock Associates v. 
Texas American Energy Corporation, 517 A. 2d 658 (Del. Ch., 1986). 
17   See Coffee, Liquidity vs. Control, supra  note 2, at 1353-54.  For a discussion of the power of ISS 
recommendations, see Steven A. Rosenblum, The Shareholder Communications Proxy Rules and Their 
Practical Effect on Shareholder Activism and Proxy Contests, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY 
AND COMPENSATION RULES 11-29 (Amy L. Goodman & John F. Olson, eds., 3rd ed., 2004). 
18   See CLARK, supra note 14, at 390-92, and John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: 
A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 866-68 (1994). 
19   For a discussion of these remedies,  see  COX, H AZEN  & O'NEAL,  supra  note 14, at §   15;  LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at §11-D-4; CLARK, supra note 14, at 639-74. 
20   See CLARK, supra note 14, at 397-98. 
21   See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 837 
(2005), citing further references; John Pound,  The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003, 1012, 1029-30 (1993); ROBERT A.G. 
MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 126 (3
rd ed., 2004). 
22   With regard to legitimacy, as the Court of Chancery of Delaware has remarked: "The shareholder 
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests." Blasius 
Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corporation, 564 A. 2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
23   "The combination of explicit contracts, the structural rules of corporate law, and the fiduciary principle 
still leave much to discretion. . . . Something must fill in the details. . . . Voting serves that function." 
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & D ANIEL R. F ISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 66 
(1991). 
24   See, e.g., Ron Harris, "The Formation of the East India Company as a Deal between Entrepreneurs and 
Outside," Working Paper, Boalt Hall School of Law, UC Berkeley (July 2004); Meir Kohn, Business 
Organizations in Pre-Industrial Europe, Working Paper 03-09, Department of Economics, Dartmouth Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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on the apparent weaknesses of allowing an unregulated mass of relatively unqualified persons 
determine solutions to oft complex and technical questions.  One group of opponents advocates strong, 
central leadership, and has been called the "managerialists."
25  Another group must de-emphasize the 
original role of shareholders in corporations so as to meet the needs of their descriptive schema, which 
sees the corporation as a mediating node, in which the interests of various economic components, or 
"team" members communally interact efficiently.
26  The managerialists view shareholders essentially 
as unqualified backseat drivers, and – as the presence of institutional investors on the U.S. market has 
grown over the decades  – have shifted their position from condemning shareholders as inexpert 
masses,
27 to warning against them as self-interested and short-sighted.
28  The team theorists do not 
disparage shareholders, but are driven primarily by the telos of their descriptive model; they ask not 
what the theorist can do to remedy the weakness in shareholder rights, but what the weakness in 
shareholder rights can do for their theory.  Their conclusion is that such weakness is both inevitable 
and beneficial, for it aids in "insulating corporate directors from the direct command and control of any 
of the groups that comprise the corporate team."
29  Thus, the managerialists and the team theorists, in 
presenting respectable and well-intended models are joined by a need to discredit shareholders as the 
                                                                                                                                                 
College (2003); Franklin A. Gevurtz, "The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of 
Directors" 16-32 (Mar. 30, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=546296; Paul G. Mahoney,  Contract or 
Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 873 (2000). 
25   As Prof. Melvin Eisenberg points out, "the managerialists . . . would achieve ends of social policy by 
increasing management power, on the theory that while shareholders are interested only in profits, and 
client-groups only in their own welfare, management is in a position to balance the claims of all groups 
dependent on the corporation, including not only client-groups and shareholders, but the general 
public; in a position, that is, to run the corporation in the public interest."  MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE 
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 25 (1976).  This term has had significantly more currency in its 
French forms – "dirigiste" and "dirigisme". 
26   See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 
247, 253 (1999). 
27   Dean Bayless Manning outlines his understanding of the public corporation in 1958: "We have known 
since 1932 that widespread public holding of shares erodes a chasm between 'ownership' and 'control' 
and . . . that the faceless mass of small stockholders is increasing by millions.  We have known, too, 
that today's large corporation may for many purposes be best viewed as an intricate, centralized, 
economic-administrative structure run by professional managers who hire capital from the investor. . . . 
Here, the buyer of stock does not know even what business the company may be in tomorrow.  He is 
betting on a management, banking on its expert judgement to steer his small investment through the 
swift currents of today's commercial stream."  Bayless Manning, Book Review of  J.A. LIVINGSTONE, 
THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER, 67 Yale L.J. 1475, 1489-90 (1958). 
28   Messrs Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum argue that "[M]any institutional and other activist 
shareholders have competing interests that may conflict with the best interests of the public corporation 
and its shareholder body and other constituencies taken as a whole. . . . Some may seek to push the 
corporation into steps designed to create a short-term pop in the company's share price so that they can 
turn a quick profit. . . . In addition, investors may have competing interests over and above their 
financial interests as shareholders.  For example, labor unions may use shareholder activism as an 
element of their collective bargaining strategy or to gain leverage over or access to managers in order 
to advance union-related objectives."  Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contest in the 
Company's Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 78 (2003). 
29   Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 255. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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sine qua non of the corporation and deny the rights that such primacy implies.  The two groups of 
opponents enlist similar arguments: they argue that shareholders have no inherent right to exercise 
voice and, even if they did, shareholder influence would still be dangerous because the biases of their 
class make them unfit to exercise control.  Because, in the corporate setting, the right of shareholders 
to influential voice has been for centuries inherent in their ownership of the corporation,
30 opponents of 
shareholder voice first try to negate shareholder ownership.
31  This argument may have gained 
credence because control is often considered the primary characteristic of ownership, and the position 
of shareholders under current governance legislation is often one of weakness rather than control.
32  
The opponents of shareholder voice also attempt to discredit shareholder influence as self-interested 
and unrestrained.
33  Given their positions, it is also understandable that the opponents of shareholder 
voice have fought fiercely against the visible trend of increasing shareholder voice in recent decades.
34 
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that the principal, legal arguments against shareholder 
voice are unfounded.  I find it particularly important to document the  existence of shareholders' 
property rights before they are talked out of existence.  This paper does not intend to reiterate the 
economic grounds that explain why shareholders are the group best suited to control a corporation.
35  
Rather, Part II will explain the legal nature of the property rights that shareholders have in 
corporations.  Part III will set forth some of the fiduciary and other duties that temper and restrain 
shareholder behavior in ways very similar to the existing legal checks on management behavior.  Part 
IV will explain how, although shareholders have complete freedom to structure their corporations as 
they will, the default structure of governance found in U.S. corporations renders shareholders almost 
completely powerless.  Part V will, by way of conclusion, outline how in recent decades the need to 
facilitate shareholder voice has gradually come into view and prompted real change at the federal level, 
which – despite strong management opposition – we can expect to continue. 
                                                 
30   "The charter of incorporation of the EIC [East India Company] defined its basic governance structure. 
This included a Governor, a Deputy Governor, a Committee of 24  – also called the ‘Court of 
Committees’ (and after 1709, the ‘Court of Directors’) – and a General Court. In fact, the full official 
name of the EIC (until 1709) was “The Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into 
the East-Indies”. The General Court was composed of all members of the company. Every member, of 
whatever status and however large a share in the joint stock, had one vote in the General Court." 
Harris, supra note 24, at 31. 
31   See Part II of this text. 
32   See Part IV of this text. 
33   See Part III of this text. 
34   "Groups such as IRRC [Investor Responsibility Research Center], ISS [Institutional  Shareholder 
Services], and CII [Council of Institutional Investors] track and publish databases of company 
responses to shareholder proposals.  As more companies accede to the demands of shareholder 
activists, thereby 'raising the bar' of what is perceived to be shareholder-friendly behavior, it becomes 
harder for the remaining companies to resist shareholder pressure when it is applied."  Andrew R. 
Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? Responding to Majority 
Vote Resolutions, 60 Bus. Law. 23, 66-67 (2004). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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II. SHAREHOLDER PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Much of the scholarship discussing the weakness of shareholders vis-à-vis management has 
centered on shareholders being the "owners" of corporations, but has usually not found it necessary to 
specify exactly what kind of property interests these shareholders have.
36  Opponents of shareholder 
voice have taken advantage of this to argue that shareholders do not actually have property rights in 
corporations, are thus not really owners of the corporation, and should therefore not demand to 
exercise influence as if they were owners.
37  It should be noted that this denial of shareholders' property 
rights could have been caused not only by the empirical impression received from the weak state of 
shareholders in contemporary corporations, but also by theories of the firm that have de-emphasized 
property rights in analyzing the contractual allocation of control within the corporation.
38 
A. Shareholders Own the Corporation, Not Its Assets 
In chiding economist Milton Friedman for referring to shareholders as the owners of 
corporations, Professor Lynn Stout explains: "A lawyer would know that the shareholders do not, in 
fact, own the corporation.  Rather, they own a type of corporate security commonly called 'stock.' As 
owners of stock, shareholders' rights are quite limited.  For example, stockholders do not have the right 
to exercise control over the corporation's assets."
39  The prominent lawyers Martin Lipton and Steven 
                                                                                                                                                 
35   See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 63-89. 
36   See, for example, ADOLF A. BERLE, GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (revised ed., 1968); MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS 
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994), and Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 Va. L. 
Rev. 1145 (1998). 
37   From the managerialist perspective, see Manning, supra note 27, at 1490; Lipton & Rosenblum, supra 
note 28, at 70-74. From the team theorist perspective, see Blair & Stout, supra note 26, generally; 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate 
Board, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 403, 409 (2001) ("Yet from a logical perspective, the naked claim that 
shareholders own the corporation is just that--a naked claim."); Lynn A. Stout,  Lecture and 
Commentary on the Social Responsibility of Corporate Entities: Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for 
Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1189 (2002).  The arguments of Professors Blair & Stouts 
have also been cited in support of related arguments regarding shareholder duties.  See Roberta S. 
Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional Shareholders? 60 Bus. Law. 1 
(2004). 
38   See John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, "Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law," ESRC Centre 
for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 2993 (Mar. 2005).  Professors 
Armour and Whincop comment that, "recent developments in the theory of the firm, whilst identifying 
the significance of allocations of control rights, have failed to explain the role played by property law 
in facilitating the sharing or partitioning of control between different participants in a firm. An 
understanding of the significance of the scope of proprietary rights—their ‘in rem’ character—points 
the way to a more complete explanation of the role played by law in supporting business enterprise. In 
particular, only property law can provide automatic enforcement of the ‘second-order’ allocations of 
entitlement to residual control in relation to assets used in productive enterprise." Id. at 13. 
39   See Stout, supra note 37, at 1191. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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Rosenblum also equate non-ownership of the company's assets, which is a black-letter principle of 
corporate law,
40 with non-ownership of the company itself:  
A share of stock does not confer ownership of the  underlying assets owned by the 
corporation. . . . Shareholders have no more claim to intrinsic ownership and control of 
the corporation's assets than do other stakeholders. . . .The rights we choose to confer on 
shareholders . . . cannot be justified on the basis of their intrinsic right as the "owners" to 
control the corporation
41 (emphasis added). 
This argument almost rises to the level of slight of hand.  Except in very rare cases of abuse, the 
principle of separation of ownership between the shareholders' assets (including their stock in the 
corporation) and the corporation's assets, together with the limited liability it entails, is for juridical 
persons universally accepted.
42  The fact that shareholders do not own a corporation's separately 
partitioned assets says absolutely nothing about whether shareholders own the corporation itself.  In 
fact, a primary function of the corporate form is precisely this partitioning of assets.
43  Referring to 
Farwell J.'s classic definition of a share of stock in Borland's Trustee v. Steel,
44 Prof. Paul Davies 
succinctly describes the difference between a corporation's status as an owner of assets and as an 
object owned by shareholders: 
The company itself is treated not merely as a person, the subject of rights and duties, but 
also as a res, the object of rights and duties.  It is the fact that the shareholder has rights 
in the company as well as against it, which, in legal theory, distinguishes the member 
from the debenture-holder whose rights are also defined by contract . . . but are rights 
against the company and, if the debenture is secured, in its property, but never in the 
company itself.
45  
                                                 
40   "Corporate property is owned by the corporation as a distinct legal person; its shareholders have only 
an indirect interest in the assets and business." COX, HAZEN & O'NEAL, supra note 14, at § 7.2;"When 
a corporation acquires property the title vests in it as a legal person distinct from its shareholders." 
Henry Winthrop Ballantine, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 119 (1946). 
41   Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 28, at 72 et seq. This failure to grasp the function of the corporate 
entity in separating the shareholders' ownership of the company from the company's ownership of its 
assets also crops up in the arguments against what some call "shareholder primacy."  Prof. Roberta S. 
Karmel repeated in 2004: "In reality, shareholders have a property interest in their shares, not in the 
corporation's assets." Karmel, supra note 37, at 1. 
42   In an analysis of  corporate law in the United States, England, Switzerland, France, Germany, and 
Japan, a team of international authors observe that "today, limited liability has become a nearly 
universal feature of the corporate form."  REINIER R. K RAAKMAN, P AUL DAVIES, H ENRY HANSMANN, 
GÉRARD  HERTIG, K LAUS  J. H OPT, H IDEKI  KANDA,  AND  EDWARD  B. R OCK,  THE  ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 8-9 (2004). 
43   "In our view . . . the separation between the firm's bonding assets and the personal assets of the firm's 
owners and managers . . . is the core defining characteristic of a legal entity, and establishing this 
separation is the principal role that organizational law plays in the organization of enterprise."  Henry 
Hansman & Reinier Kraakman,  The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387, 393 
(2000). 
44   Borland's Trustee v. Steel [1901] 1 Ch. 279 at 288. 
45   PAUL DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES' PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 616-17 (7
th ed. 2003). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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Beyond equating the corporation as an entity with the assets such entity owns, Prof. Stout and 
Messrs. Lipton and Rosenblum seem to have all taken their understanding of ownership from William 
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, which define property as “that sole and despotic 
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion 
of the right of any other individual in the universe.”
46  As a result, they assert that the indirectness and 
non-exclusiveness  of the relationship between an individual shareholder and a publicly listed 
corporation negates a finding of true ownership.  Prof. Stout observes: 
As a legal matter, shareholders accordingly enjoy neither direct control over the firm's 
assets nor direct access to them. . . . Thus, while it perhaps is excusable to loosely 
describe a closely held firm with a single controlling shareholder as "owned" by that 
shareholder, it is misleading to use the language of ownership to describe the relationship 
between a public firm and its shareholders.
47 
Messrs. Lipton and Rosenblum are of like mind: "the ownership of a share of stock in a public 
company is simply not analogous to the ownership of a car or a building . . . .  A share of stock is a 
financial instrument, more akin to a bond than to a car or a building. . . . The owner of the building . . . 
is an individual . . . in a position to have full knowledge . . . . [and who] generally views the property 
or business as a complete entity . . . . In contrast, the shareholder of the large public corporation is one 
of a far-flung, diverse, and ever-changing group."
48  These observations of Prof. Stout and Messrs. 
Lipton and Rosenblum on the difference between an owner in "sole and despotic dominion" of her 
property and the  position of a shareholder in a modern public company do not really tell us much 
about whether shareholders own their corporations. 
Most experts no longer understand the nature of property in the "despotic dominion" terms set 
forth by Blackstone in the eighteenth century, but rather see property as constituted by various types of 
"bundles" of different kinds of rights, with variations in the bundle constituting different kinds of 
interests.
49  In the list assembled by A.M. Honoré, such rights include not only the more intuitively 
                                                 
46   WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Book 2, chapter 1 
(1765-1769). 
47   Stout, supra note 37, at 1191. 
48   Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 28, at 72-73.  Messrs Lipton and Rosenblum appear to take literally 
an argument that Dean Manning presented about 40 years earlier only analogically in a description of a 
shareholder's economic and psychological position: "[T]he model is useful because, in the case of a 
large, publicly-held modern corporation, it approximates reality.  Except in the context of the closely-
held corporation, the limited notion of the shareholder as owner of a 'share'  – a reified legal and 
economic bundle – is surely more valid than our historical image of the shareholder as 'owner' of the 
corporation.'  To view the shareholder as the owner only of a share of stock – as a bondholder is said to 
own 'the bond' – conforms for more closely to the shareholder's own expectations and describes far 
more accurately what he in fact handles as his own  – buying, selling and giving away." Manning, 
supra note 27, at 1492. 
49   "Today, the bundle of rights conception of property rules the academic roost." Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomobsky, "What Property Is," Research Paper No. 04-05, University of Pennsylvania Law School 
Institute for Law and Economics 15 (2004).  The U.S. Supreme Court routinely uses the "bundle of Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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appealing rights to "use" and "manage", but also "the right to the income of the thing, the right to the 
capital, the right to security . . . the rights or incidents of transmissibility and absence of term . . . and 
the incident of residuarity."
50  The incident of "residuarity" is perhaps the best known of the bundle in 
contemporary corporate law.  As Judge Frank Easterbrook and Prof. Daniel Fischel have explained: 
"Investors bear the risk of failure (sometimes we call them 'risk bearers') and receive the marginal 
rewards of success. Equity investors are paid last, after debt investors, employees, and other investors 
with (relatively) 'fixed' claims. These equity investors have the 'residual' claim in the sense that they get 
only what is left over – but they get all of what is left over."
51  Indeed, shares of stock embody a pro 
rata right to the residual assets of a corporation upon dissolution.
52  However, "residuarity" has more 
than a temporal (i.e., last in line) meaning.  As Prof. John Armour and the late Prof. Michael Whincop 
note: "'Residual' implies that the rights to control over all states of the world which are not specified by 
law or contract ex ante.  Residuarity matters because it is still possible to allocate residual rights even 
if specific directions about what should (not) be done in particular circumstances cannot be written or 
enforced."
53  Thus, when a power has not been provided for in any of the statutes or contractual 
documents allocating control in a firm, residuarity would leave that power with the firm's owners. 
Many other property rights and incidents are embodied in shares of stock.  If the charter does 
not provide otherwise,
54 common shares in a stock corporation are without term.  Most corporate 
statutes provide shareholders with (rarely used) residual control over a corporation that is apparently 
absolute, in that management may be taken away from the board of directors in the corporate charter.
55  
Even in the weaker form of shareholder control customarily used, shareholders have control though the 
                                                                                                                                                 
rights" metaphor in its decisions on the Takings Clause, U.S. Const., amend. V.  For example, in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Court explained: "the question 
must turn, in accord with this Court's 'takings' jurisprudence, on citizens' historic understandings 
regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that they acquire when they 
take title to property."  Id. at 1004. Also see Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional 
Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000).  For discussion of problems with and challenges to the "bundle" 
theory, see Adam Mossoff, What is Property, Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371 
(2003). 
50   A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 113 (A.G. Guest, ed. 
1961). "A.M. Honoré played a decisive role in advancing the bundle or rights metaphor by cataloguing 
a generally accepted list of the 'incidents' or property or ownership." Bell & Gideon, supra note 49, at 
15. 
51   EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 11. 
52   See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 275 and 281; and § 14.01(5) RMBCA. 
53   Armour & Whincop, supra note 38, at 6. 
54   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 151, and § 6.01 RMBCA. 
55   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a): "The . . . corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of 
a board . . . except as may be provided otherwise in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation" 
(emphasis added).  RMBCA § 7.32(a): "An agreement among the shareholders . . . is effective . . . even 
though . . . it . . . eliminates the board of directors or restricts the discretion or powers of the board of 
directors." Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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right to elect or remove directors,
56 and veto rights over a merger
57 or the transmission of the corporate 
assets to a third party.
58 In addition to the right to receive capital as a residual claimant at dissolution, 
as discussed above, shareholders also have a statutorily recognized right to receive income in the form 
of dividends,
59 and such distributions cannot be invalidated by creditors if they comply with the 
statutory capital maintenance rules.  Shareholders also have the right to exclude directors, third 
parties, and other shareholders from their property through various types of judicial remedies under 
corporate law statutes, such as actions against management for breach of statutory or common law 
fiduciary duties, including self-dealing, waste of corporate assets, dilution of their pro rata interest 
though the issuance of stock below par value, or a failure of any stockholder to pay the subscription 
price.
60 
The pro rata and cooperative natures of these interests in property and rights over property do 
not decrease their proprietary aspect, but are precisely the genius of the share of stock, as it "protects 
the entitlements of co-owners against opportunistic attempts by one of them to grant entitlements to 
third parties that undermine the other co-owners’ claims.  It does so by making their entitlements to the 
assets generally enforceable. Hence it affects an open-ended set of potential third parties who might 
deal with the firm."
61  Unlike a contract right, ownership will  "run with the assets,"
62 and a 
shareholder's right to residual assets upon a corporation's liquidation allows an action for recovery of 
the property if such assets are improperly transferred to a third party, including the holders of a 
different class of shares.
63  The design of this property interest significantly reduces monitoring costs.
64  
                                                 
56   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 211(b) and 141(k); and §§ 8.03(c) and 8.08(a). 
57   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251(c), and § 11.04(b). 
58   See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 271(a), and § 12.02 RMBCA. 
59   See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 170 and 154; § 6.40 RMBCA. 
60   See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 327; § 7.40 RMBCA. 
61   Armour & Whincop, supra note 38, at 3. 
62   "For our purposes, the attribute that distinguishes a property right from a contract right is that a 
property right is enforceable, not just against the original grantor of the right, but also against other 
persons to whom possession of the asset, or other rights in the asset, are subsequently transferred. In 
the parlance of property law, the burden of a property right “runs with the asset.”" Henry Hansmann & 
Reiner R. Kraakman, Property, Contract and Verification: The Numerus Clauses Problem and the 
Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 373, 378-379 (2002). 
63   Mohawk Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Delaware Rayon Co., 110 A.2d 305 (Del. Ch. 1954).  Another 
interesting case involving the property rights attaching to shares is the right of a shareholder to 
separate dividend rights from a share when it is sold in close proximity to the annual meeting at which 
dividends will be declared, thereby causing the profit rights accruing to a share of stock purchased ex 
dividend spring back only after such immediately succeeding declaration, and certainly giving the 
original shareholder an actionable right against any subsequent purchaser who happens to erroneously 
receive the dividends declared at such meeting. 
64   Armour & Whincop, supra note 38, at 11. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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Shares need not express fee simple interests in land to embody property rights.
65  As is the case with 
most interests in property, the nature of the interests they embody are tailored to the purposes they 
serve.  Courts agree on this point.
66 
B. The Nature of a Shareholder's Property Interest 
Perhaps it is the intangible nature of the interest embodied in a share of stock that has confused 
the opponents of shareholder voice.
67  The Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 
points out that, "shares of stock are property, but they are intangible and incorporeal property, an 
'incorporeal, intangible thing,' existing only in abstract legal contemplation.  There are cases, however, 
in which they have been referred to as tangible property, in some respects at least; but it would seem 
that, in such cases, the court had reference rather to the physical representative of the shares, that is, to 
the share certificate, than to the shares themselves."
68  Under Delaware Law, as the Delaware Court of 
Chancery has explained, "[a] certificate of stock is evidence of ownership, in the nature of a chose in 
action."
69  The stock certificate is evidence of the share of ownership, which itself is not tangible, and 
thus the share, quota, or portion of the corporation owned by the shareholder cannot be taken into 
possession the way the certificate that evidences it can be.  A "chose in action is a known legal 
                                                 
65   "The 'bundle of sticks' conception views the law of property as creating an almost random variety of 
rights and duties that the law recognizes in the standard owner.  While Honore’s list of property 
'incidents' has been extremely influential, there is little agreement among scholars as to the relative 
importance of sticks in the bundle, and even as to the usual bundle’s contents." Bell & Gideon, supra 
note 49, at 53. 
66   In addressing federalist issues of taxation, the U.S. Supreme Court has observed that, "The interest of 
the shareholder entitles him to participate in the net profits earned by the bank in the employment of its 
capital, during the existence of its charter, in proportion to the number of his shares; and, upon its 
dissolution or termination, to his proportion of the property that may remain of the corporation after 
the payment of its debts. This is a distinct independent interest or property, held by the shareholder like 
any other property that may belong to him." Van Allen v. The Assessors, 70 U.S. 573, 584, (1865). 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, citing the foregoing decision 50 years later, also found 
classic property rights to exist in the shares of a stock corporation: "It is an incident of such shares that 
the owner is entitled to participate in the net profits earned, to enforce the use of its capital for its 
corporate purposes, to restrain abuses of corporate powers, and to receive his proportion of the property 
of the corporation remaining after the payment of its debts upon its dissolution. Bellows Falls Power 
Co. v. Com., 222 Mass. 51, 58; 109 N.E. 891, 895 (1915).  In one among the many decisions 
distinguishing stock from contractual debt for tax purposes, the Federal Circuit has observed: "Stock is 
an equity; it represents an ownership interest. It is to be distinguished from obligations such as notes or 
bonds which are not equities, and represent no ownership interest. . . . 'The characteristics of stock are 
a right to participate proportionately in all profits, and in management, and in the distribution of net 
assets on liquidation; the characteristics of a note are a definite obligor, a definite obligee (either by 
name or designation), a definitely ascertainable obligation, and a time of maturity, either definite or 
that will become definite.'" U.S. v. Evans, 375 F.2d 730 (9
th Cir. 1967), citing: 3 PAUL & MERTENS, 
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 170 (1934). 
67   See supra note 48 and accompanying text displaying the importance that Messrs. Lipton & Rosenblum 
place on a share of stock not being the same as a car or a building. 
68   WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5097 
(updated to 2004). 
69   Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 67 A.2d 50, 54 (Del.Ch. 1949). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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expression used to describe all personal rights of property which can only be claimed or enforced by 
action and not by taking physical possession."
70  Thus, it has the name "chose" (French for thing) in 
"action", as opposed to thing in possession.
71  Again, possession is impossible because a "[c]hose in 
action is a thing incorporeal and only a right."
72   
Various U.S. jurisdictions have come to terms with this form of intangible property in different 
ways.  New Jersey has retained the concept of "chose in action," finding that "[t]he share i n the 
corporation constitutes a chose in action which is an intangible property right.  The certificate itself, 
however, the document evidencing stock ownership, is considered tangible personal property."
73  In a 
1957 decision, the Court of Appeals of New York received the false impression that "chose in action" 
was understood in England and Massachusetts as a contract, rather than a property right, and thus 
steered clear of the term in order to affirm that shares are "personal property" and subject to the rules 
of transfer for property.
74  In Illinois, shares of corporations are choses in action that constitute 
incorporeal rights.
75  The Court of Appeal of Louisiana has found that "shares of stock in a 
corporation represent not money but a proportionate interest in the rights and property of the 
corporation, whatever they may be and wherever they are, subject to the corporation's obligations."
76  
The California Court of Appeals has recently applied a similar concept to stock options, explaining 
that, "[a]n employee stock option grant is thus 'not an expectancy but a chose in action, a form of 
property . . .' susceptible of division in spite of being contingent or not having vested."
77  Thus, the 
property right evidenced by a share of stock is no less a property right because it does not vest in 
specifically identified assets,
78 like specified "cars or buildings" belonging to General Motor's 
                                                 
70   J. CROSSLEY VAINES, PERSONAL PROPERTY 221 (3
rd ed., 1962), citing Channel J, Torkington v. Magee, 
[1902] 2 K.B. 247, 430. 
71   "In English law property is classified into real property ("land, tenements and hereditaments") and 
personal property. The latter is divided into chattels real (interests in land, e.g. a lease) and chattels 
personal (all property other than real property and chattels real). Chattels personal are subdivided into 
things (or "choses") in possession (which can be recovered by reduction into possession) and things (or 
"choses") in action (which can only be recovered by action in the courts). The former includes tangible 
moveable property, the latter intangible personal property such as rights and debts. Shares are 
"property" within R.S.C. 1965, Ord. 86: Woodlands v Hinds [1955] 1 W.L.R. 688, 690. They are 
personal estate ( s 182(1)(a))." SWEET AND MAXWELL, PALMERS COMPANY LAW 2.006 (2003). 
72   VAINES, supra note 70, at 13. 
73   Registrar & Transfer Co. v. Director, Division of Taxation, Dept. of Treasury, 398 A.2d 1335, 1338 
(N.J.Super.A.D., 1979). 
74   See Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 541; 161 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422 (1957).  For the actual 
position in Massachusetts see Bellows Falls Power, supra note [•], and with regard to England  see 
PALMERS COMPANY LAW, supra note 71 and DAVIES supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
75   See First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 1872 WL 8367 (1872). 
76   Succession of Heckert, 160 So.2d 375, 383 (La.App., 1964). See also Hook v. Hoffman, 16 Ariz. 540, 
546 (Arizona S.Ct. 1915); Barksdale & als. v. Finney & als., 55 Va. 338 (Virginia S.Ct. 1858). 
77   In re Marriage of Margaret and Grant Palin, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4318, Jan. 31, 2002. 
78   Ballantine, supra note 136, at 289. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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inventory, just as the property right in a share of stock does not disappear merely because under 
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code a shareholder has only a pro rata property interest in all 
shares of the same type that are held in fungible bulk by her broker.
79   
Perhaps the  shared  nature of this interest makes it seem less like our intuitive picture of 
Blackacre, but the sharing aspect of a shareholder's interest is essential to the corporate form, and 
history has shown that property interests are constructed and evolve to meet the particular legal and 
economic purposes they are meant to serve.
80  Prof. Armour and the late Prof. Whincop argue that a 
corporation consists of "proprietary foundations" and a "contractarian superstructure."
81  These two 
mechanisms work to allow  joint  sharing between multiple owners, delegation of entitlements to 
managers, and sequential sharing (triggered by default) between owners and creditors.
82  The division 
of entitlements can be structured in a "contractarian" manner through agreements, corporate charters 
and corporate statutes, but "[s]econdly—and more importantly—the law provides mechanisms 
whereby the scope of the parcels of entitlements given to each participant is made, to use Hohfeld’s 
term, ‘multital’. That is, their entitlements are protected not just against other participants to the 
voluntary arrangement, but against persons generally.  In short, the arrangements are given 
proprietary effect."
83  This allows free transferability of shares to third parities, who will assume 
exactly the same rights and restrictions as all holders of the same class of shares, without conducting 
additional contracting.  Thus, the absence of "despotic dominion" over the corporation, i.e., the lack of 
an ability to use or dispose of the assets in an individual capacity, does not negate that property law 
still serves as a workhorse to enable the multifaceted nature of the corporate structure to function.
84  In 
light of this, Prof. Stout's recommendation – "The time has come to lead the 'shareholder ownership' 
argument for shareholder primacy to the back of the barn, and to put it out of its misery"
85 – would 
seem inappropriate. 
                                                 
79   See § 8-503(b) Uniform Commercial Code: "An entitlement holder's property interest with respect to a 
particular financial asset . . . is a pro rata property interest in all interests in that financial asset held by 
the securities intermediary, without regard to the time the entitlement holder acquired the security 
entitlement or the time the securities intermediary acquired the interest in that financial asset." 
80   See Mahoney, supra note 24, at 877-78. 
81   Armour & Whincop, supra note 38, at 16. 
82   Id. at 15. 
83   Id. at 16. 
84   Id. at 19. 
85   See Stout, supra note 37, at 1192. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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III. SHAREHOLDER DUTIES 
Perhaps the strongest argument for management dominance of corporations is the finely tuned 
body of fiduciary duties that courts have designed to restrict self-dealing by corporate directors.
86  The 
corresponding assertion that shareholder actions are not restricted by fiduciary duties is, however, 
untrue.  This assertion tends to ignore both the fiduciary duties to which shareholders have been 
subjected and the fact that judicial imposition of duties arises only where there is at least an allegation 
of an abuse.  A court would rarely define a duty restricting a power before the power is even used.
87  
Therefore, the limited state of shareholder fiduciary duties simply marks the relatively narrow 
boundaries of shareholder power ordinarily exercised.  It is also argued that any shareholder nominee 
to the board would be somehow less useful to the corporation because nominated by a shareholder.
88  
This argument resembles the slight-of-hand confusion between ownership of a company and ownership 
of the company's assets, which is discussed above.
89  Absent particular rights for a class of securities, 
members of the board are elected by the same, required majority and subjected to the same fiduciary 
duties regardless of who nominates them.
90  Opponents of shareholder voice also ignore the extensive 
and restricting duties imposed on shareholders under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
"Exchange Act"),
91 particularly §§ 13 and 16.
92 
A. Shareholder Fiduciary Duties 
Fiduciary duties arise in a relationship in which "one party (the 'fiduciary') acts on behalf of 
another party (the 'beneficiary') while exercising  discretion with respect to a  critical resource 
belonging to the beneficiary."
93  "What distinguishes a fiduciary from many other contracting parties . . 
. is that a fiduciary exercises discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary, 
whereas most contracting parties exercise discretion only with respect to their own performance under 
the contract."
94  Classic examples of fiduciary relationships are those between a trustee and a 
                                                 
86   See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 28, at 79, and Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 291, 314-319. 
87   The use of declaratory judgments can extend beyond preventative measures, and courts may no longer 
in all circumstances require that a defendant have already violated a duty owed to the plaintiff.  
Restatement of the Law, Second, Judgments § 33 (1982).  However, the opponents of shareholder voice 
do not allege any specific circumstances to exist in which shareholders lack a duty that would be 
prerequisite for them to have more power.  
88   See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 28, at 82-83, and Karmel, supra note 37, at 9-14. 
89   See note Part II.A. 
90   See  Lucian Arye Bebchuk,  The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59  BUS. L AW. 43, 58 
(2003). 
91   Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a—78mm (2000). 
92   15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m and 78p. 
93   D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. R EV. 1399, 1402 
(2002). 
94   Id. at 1403. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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beneficiary, a managing partner and her co-partners, and an agent and a principal.  "As the number of 
relations similar to existing fiduciary relations increased, the courts began t o analogize the new 
relations to the established fiduciary prototypes, and to apply the rules of the prototypes to the new 
relations.  Corporate law, for example, frequently analogizes directors to trustees, agents, and 
managing partners."
95  Such analogies are successfully made for the relationship between a corporate 
director and a shareholder, as it displays all of the qualities specified in the definition of the fiduciary 
relationship quoted at the beginning of this paragraph:  the shareholders elect the director to act on 
their behalf by exercising expert discretion regarding the management of the corporation, which is an 
asset belonging in pro rata shares to each holder of a chose in action embodied in the corporate stock. 
Messrs. Lipton and Rosenblum strongly agree that directors are fiduciaries.  They stress that, 
"directors and officers of the corporation are the only constituency that has legal obligations to act in 
the best interests of the corporation."
96  They recognize no similar duty for shareholders:  "In their 
capacity as shareholders, the legal system allows them to act purely in their self-interest.  They are not 
fiduciaries and they do not owe legal duties to the corporation, other shareholders, or the corporation's 
other constituencies."
97  This is their primary argument against increased shareholder influence.  Their 
assertion is incorrect.  Shareholders have borne fiduciary duties at least since the late 19
th century.
98  
Currently under Delaware law,
99 and the laws of most U.S. jurisdictions,
100 a shareholder owes a 
fiduciary duty to the corporation and any minority shareholders if he either "owns a majority in or 
exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation."
101  If a controlling equity stake is not 
obviously present, a plaintiff may still prove the existence of a relationship triggering a fiduciary duty 
by demonstrating domination of "a minority shareholder through actual control of corporation 
                                                 
95   Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 795, 805 (1983). 
96   Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 28, at 79. 
97   Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 28, at 73. 
98   See Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Works [1873-74] LR 9 Ch. App. 350 (The majority shareholder may 
not liquidate a company in order to unfairly profit from purchase of its assets to the detriment of the 
minority.); Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 27 F. 625 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (A majority that controls 
the corporation freely assumes the trust relation occupied by the corporation towards its stockholders). 
99   For an excellent analysis of the duties of controlling shareholders under Delaware law, see Ronald J. 
Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785, 786 
(2005). 
100   See COX, H AZEN & O'NEAL, supra note 14, at § 11.10, and, disagreeing with the imposition of such 
duties, Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 
175 (2004). 
101   Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987). Also  see  THE 
AMERICAN  LAW  INSTITUTE, P RINCIPLES OF  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE: A NALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.10 (1994).  Such duties are particularly evident for the shareholders of closed 
corporations, who are often attributed fiduciary duties resembling those of a partner.  See Donahue v. 
Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975), and Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's 
Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699 (1993). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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conduct."
102  When such control exists, a controlling shareholder stands on both sides of transactions 
that it enters into with the controlled company, and such transactions are subjected to the strict, 
"intrinsic fairness" or "entire fairness" analysis,
103 which is the strictest standard applied in Delaware 
corporate law.
104  This is the standard that is also applied to directors when they stand on both sides of 
a transaction.
105  Thus the fiduciary principles applied to directors and shareholders are of like kind.  
The existing differences are caused by the different powers exercised by directors and shareholders. 
Leading members of and experts on the Delaware Chancery Court explain that fiduciary duties 
in Delaware corporation law have developed as ex post judicial controls filling a vacuum created by 
receding, ex ante mandatory restrictions on director behavior, thus illustrating how fiduciary duties 
tend to develop where powers susceptible of abuse are present: 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the mandatory features of the statutory law 
gradually decreased. Statutes became increasingly e legant and flexible, continuously 
moving away from a mandatory or prescriptive model and ever closer to a pure 
contractual or enabling model. As a consequence, what emerged as a counterpoint to the 
evolution of the enabling model of corporation law was the second key function of the law 
of corporations: the  ex post  judicial review of the actions of corporate officers and 
directors, measured by fiduciary principles. Fiduciary review imported into corporate law 
the centuries-old equity tradition that subjected the conduct of fiduciaries to judicial 
supervision. Corporate directors came to be viewed as a species of fiduciary, not so 
constrained as trustees or executors to be sure, but subject nonetheless to a pervasive duty 
of loyalty when exercising their broad powers over corporate property and processes.
106  
If we recall the definition of fiduciary duty offered at the beginning of this section, we can see 
how the Delaware courts could import fiduciary principles for application to shareholders as 
circumstances arose in an economy in which large, networked corporate groups have become more and 
more common.  The three, primary elements of a fiduciary relationship according to the cited definition 
are that the fiduciary (i) acts on behalf of another party (ii) while exercising discretion (iii) over a 
critical resource belonging to the beneficiary.
107  Major decisions on the fate of a corporation, such as 
its merger with another firm or its dissolution, must normally be approved by a majority vote of the 
stock entitled to vote on such decisions.
108  It is a characteristic of majority rule that, when a 
shareholders' resolution is duly adopted, the minority must acquiesce to the majority, whom the 
                                                 
102   Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989), cited in Kahn v. Lynch 
Communications Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114 (Del. 1994). 
103   Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1115. 
104   Gilson & Gordon, supra note 99, at 791. 
105   Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983), citing Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 
91 A.2d 57, 57-58 (Del. 1952). 
106   William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr.,  Function Over Form: A Reassessment of 
Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. Law. 1287, 1289 (2001). 
107   For a detailed discussion of each of these elements, see Smith, supra note 93, at 1402-04. 
108   See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 251(c) and 271(a). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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minority has (pursuant to the governance rules) essentially appointed as its agent to exercise discretion 
(in accordance with the shareholders' resolution) regarding the corporation (an asset belonging to all of 
the shareholders).
109  Accordingly, in the rare cases in which shareholders are able to exercise power 
over the corporation, such power may be understood to be subject to fiduciary duties.  The cases prove 
this to be true. 
The 1971 case of Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien
110 presents a good example of the powers that 
have come to be typical of holding companies in multinational groups and the corollary application of 
fiduciary duties.  Among its many other subsidiaries, Sinclair Oil Corporation held 97 % of the equity 
of Sinclair Venezuelan Oil Company ("Sinven"), and elected its entire board of directors.
111  As is 
typical of a corporate group, Sinclair caused Sinven's board to enter into a supply contract with 
another one of its subsidiaries, and the contract specified quantities and terms of payment.
112  When 
the subsidiary breached the quantities and payment terms, Sinclair caused Sinven to refrain from 
enforcing due performance of the contract.
113  The Court found that Sinclair had engaged in self-
dealing with Sinven, that it had benefited itself to the detriment of Sinven's minority shareholders, and 
that, like a director transacting with a corporation, Sinclair was required to prove that "causing Sinven 
not to enforce the contract was intrinsically fair to the minority shareholders of Sinven."
114  Another 
typical exercise of holding company power is seen when the controlling shareholder seeks to reorganize 
the group holding structure.  The 1994 case of  Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc.,
115 
addressed efforts by a 43 % shareholder, Alcatel U.S.A. Corp., to prevent its subsidiary, Lynch 
Communications System, from merging with another company, and instead force it to become a wholly 
owned member of the corporate group.
116  Although Alcatel held less than 50 % of Lynch's stock, the 
                                                 
109   Such "cooperative efforts," even if not formally regulated by statutory rules, always present a certain 
agency relationship.  See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, in MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: 
GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 83, 86 (2000).  Rather than looking at 
this as a contractual, agency relationship, the delegation of power to the majority could also be 
understood as an inherent characteristic of the property interests that shareholders hold in the firm. See 
the discussion of joint-owner agency problems, in Armour & Whincop, supra note 38, at 10. Prof. 
Smith also notes that his own "description of fiduciary relationships bears a strong resemblance to the 
description of 'firms' in the property rights theory pioneered by economists Sanford Grossman, Oliver 
Hart, and John Moore . . . . The central insight of the property rights theory of the firm is that an 
appropriate allocation of ownership rights over the assets of a firm reduces the likelihood that one party 
will unfairly take advantage of the other participants within the firm."  Smith,  supra note 93, at 1404-
05. 
110   280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
111   Sinclair, 280 A.2d, at 719. 
112   Id. at 722-23. 
113   Id. at 723. 
114   Id. 
115   638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
116   Kahn, 638 A.2d, at 1112. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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Delaware Supreme Court found that it was a controlling shareholder because it was able to dominate 
Lynch's board.
117  Because Alcatel was found to have the power to dominate Lynch, the fiduciary 
duties of a controlling shareholder were attributed to it, and its actions were subjected to "the exclusive 
standard of judicial review in examining the propriety of an interested cash-out merger transaction by a 
controlling or dominating shareholder [with its subsidiary, i.e.,] . . . entire fairness."
118  These, together 
with many other cases,
119 show that when shareholders have the power to control a corporation and in 
so doing prejudice the corporation or the rights of the minority, such shareholders are held to a 
fiduciary standard approaching, if not identical to, that of directors. 
The fiduciary duties of shareholders have been extended as far as necessary to cover the actual, 
dominating power of shareholders, which  – absent a corporate group in which a powerful holding 
dominates a network of subsidiaries  – is in practice not very far.  Where, however, a minority 
shareholder is given significant control over the fate of the corporation, such as where because of a 
high supermajority provision the minority is able to block corporate action, courts have found that also 
a minority has fiduciary duties.  For example, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts has found that a 
charter provision requiring an 80 % majority of the capital to approve specified actions, "may have 
substantially the effect of reversing the usual roles of the majority and the minority shareholders. The 
minority, under that provision, becomes an ad hoc controlling interest."
120  Individual shareholders are 
also capable of working in concert to exercise control.  The American Law Institute's Principles of 
Corporate Governance explicitly include power obtained "pursuant to an arrangement or 
understanding with one or more other persons" as creating the status of "controlling shareholder."
121 
                                                 
117   Id. at 1114-15. 
118   Id. at 1117. 
119   See, e.g., In re Digex, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 789 A.2d 1176 (Del. Ch. 2000) (In the context of 
negotiating a possible parent-subsidiary merger, the subsidiary's waiver of the protective devices such 
as § 203 Delaware General Corporation Law must be evaluated under the entire fairness standard.); In 
re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002) (In the context of a 
squeeze-out tender offer, the subsidiary should be empowered to use all defensive measures against the 
controlling shareholder that are acceptable for a third party tender offer). 
120   Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 802 (1981) (In a close corporation with four 
shareholders, one shareholder's refusal to approve dividends needed to reduce danger of an assessment 
under the Internal Revenue Code violated the shareholder's fiduciary duty by recklessly running serious 
and unjustified risks that penalty taxes – which were in fact then assessed – would be assessed.)  This 
case presented a clear measure of whether the decision of the minority had breached the shareholder's 
fiduciary duty.  In the case of a minority that refuses to tender its shares into an offer with a minimum 
tender requirement, the courts can be less sure that the minority has breached its duty by failing to 
tender and causing the collapse of the offer, rather than acting on the basis of legitimate business 
reasons.  See Medical Air Technology Corporation v. Marwan Investment, Inc., 303 F.3d 11, 21 (1
st 
Cir. 2002). 
121   THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 101, at § 1.10. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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Prof. Roberta Karmel asked in the title of a 2004 law review article: "Should a duty to the 
corporation be imposed on institutional shareholders"?
122  This query does not seek to tie into and 
extend the existing duties of shareholders in order to address more recent problems, but rather offers 
other findings and recommendations.  Prof. Karmel argues that, during the "new economy" bubble of 
the 1990's, institutional investors exercised power that "pressured corporate executives to think like 
shareholders and be compensated in equity."
123  She sees this as the cause of an increase in "executive 
compensation to historically high levels."
124  Executive management was further subjected to 
"[p]ressures by institutional investors for ever higher quarterly earnings . . . [until] [t]he temptation to 
manage earnings became too great."
125  To make matters worse, after shareholders created a dangerous 
situation by corrupting management's compensation culture and pressuring them to stretch the truth, 
they then "did a poor job of analyzing corporate finances and prospects, or at the very least acquiesced 
in unrealistic valuations,"
126 which caused the tragic bubble.  From the facts she describes and the 
blame she  ascribes, it would seem that Prof. Karmel is proposing to impute a duty of careful 
monitoring on shareholders.  Her solution, however, is at least in part to subject the exercise of 
shareholder voice itself – even absent actual control  – to the fiduciary d uty (of loyalty) borne by 
controlling shareholders: any shareholder that nominates a candidate to the board "in opposition to the 
selection by an existing board . . . in appropriate cases . . . [should] be held to the same kind of duties 
that are imposed on controlling shareholders."
127  That this recommendation is unworkable can be seen 
using an analogy to a single director and the board as a body: it would be equivalent to imposing sole 
liability for a board resolution on an individual director who proposes the item, which the entire board 
then approves.  To impute controlling shareholder liability to a nominating shareholder would (i) 
ignore the absence of actual shareholder influence, (ii) the intervening majority vote to elect the 
director, and (iii) the director's own fiduciary duties in exercising her discretion, and would (iv) also 
discount the value of the duty placed on any shareholder who actually does exercise control. 
In addition to imposing this fiduciary duty, Prof. Karmel has an additional proposal.  She also 
recommends that the nominating shareholders "undertake to monitor the directors they propose and 
                                                 
122   Karmel, supra note 37, at 1. 
123   Id. at 3.  This assertion that institutional investors twisted the arms of executive management until they 
accepted outrageous compensation packages is not only counterintuitive, but is also contrary to at least 
anecdotal evidence.  For example, in the Delaware case of State of Wisconsin Investment Board v. 
Peerless Systems Corp., No. 17,637, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000), shareholders 
attempted to vote down the board's attempt to expand a stock option plan, only to be meet with board 
tactics designed to thwart the shareholder's vote by manipulating the machinery used to effect such 
vote. 
124   Karmel, supra note 37, at 8. 
125   Id. at 9. 
126   Id. at 7. 
127   Id. at 20-21. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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remain shareholders for the duration of the terms of office of such directors."
128  She does not propose 
a similar duty for nominations made by board members.  The duty would not be fiduciary duty, but 
rather a mandatory transfer restriction or lock-up on the shares participating in such nominations for 
the duration of the director's term of office.  It cannot be assumed that Prof. Karmel intends this 
proposal to be taken seriously, but if it were, its potential, prejudicial impact on the liquidity of an 
issuer's securities, the markets as a whole, and the severe chilling effect on a shareholder's right to 
exercise voice, are obvious.  The threat of liability and restricted ownership would effectively prevent 
all but the most committed shareholders from nominating directors.
129  However, this elimination of 
shareholder voice would encourage use of a more "effective" option: exit.  Prof. Karmel explains:  
"Probably the most effective lever institutions have is their ability to drive down the price of a 
company's stock by refusing to invest or selling shares."
130  Having offered this alternative, however, 
she does not look into the probability that promoting use of exit and discouraging the use of voice 
would create exactly the kind of short-term oriented, low-monitoring shareholder that she apparently 
seeks to censure.
131 
B. Duties under the Exchange Act 
1. Reporting Duties under § 13(d) Exchange Act 
We have s een that courts imposed fiduciary duties on corporate actors where necessary to 
prevent those with power over the assets of others from extracting undue rents.
132  During much of the 
period in which courts were developing these duties in corporate law, the federal government and the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were codifying new, mandatory provisions of 
securities law to guard against similar abuses.  Although not fiduciary duties, per se, obligations like 
the regular disclosure of related-party transactions,
133 for example, are designed to counter the same 
type of abuses that fiduciary duties are used to control.
134  The securities laws impose numerous duties 
                                                 
128   Id. at 20-21. 
129   As early as 1991, Prof. Coffee outlined the broad lines of a policy to encourage shareholder monitoring.  
Such a policy should try to (i) free shareholders from conflicts of interest, (ii) encourage shareholders 
to take stakes large enough to make monitoring worth while, (iii) encourage shareholders to adopt a 
holding term that is long enough to make monitoring a good investment, and (iv) structure contracts 
with external managers in such a way that they have an incentive to engage in monitoring. See Coffee, 
Liquidity vs. Control, supra note 2, at 1336-42. 
130   Id. at 14. 
131   See Lawrence E. Harris, supra note 13. 
132   See Allen et al., supra note 106. 
133   Pursuant to Regulation S - K under the Exchange Act,  a registered company must disclose any 
transaction exceeding $60,000 between itself or any of its subsidiaries and a shareholder who owns 
more than 5 % of any class of its voting securities or a family member of such shareholder. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.404(a). 
134  "The core fiduciary duty of a trustee is an obligation to act in the interest of the beneficiary of the trust. 
The most important aspect of this obligation is a duty to avoid self-interested transactions." Smith, 
supra note 93, at 1453. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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on the shareholders of registered companies.
135  This subsection will discuss only two sets of such 
duties:
136 the disclosure of holdings pursuant to § 13 Exchange Act and the treatment of shareholders 
as insiders under § 16 Exchange Act. 
Although designed to prevent oppressive, surprise takeovers, the rules under § 13 Exchange Act 
affect a much broader area of shareholder activity, and  can  present a significant obstacle to 
coordinated exercise of shareholder voice in normal governance.  Under Rule 13d, any person who 
acquires directly or indirectly more than 5   % of either the "voting power"
137 or  the "investment 
power"
138 of any class of equity security registered under § 12 Exchange Act,
139 must file a Schedule 
13D with the SEC within 10 days after the acquisition.
140  A "person" includes "two or more persons" 
who agree "to act together for the purpose  of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing of equity 
securities."
141  This group concept may be necessary to catch coordinated takeover activity, but it also 
works to restrict valuable shareholder monitoring.  The threat of aggregation into a group can prevent 
shareholders with small holdings from coordinating action with their fellow shareholders in connection 
with an annual meeting, lest they be found to "act together for . . . voting" their shares and trigger the 
requirements of §   13.  Although mere informal discussions among shareholders regarding 
management's performance has been found not to constitute a "group" for purposes of § 13(d) 
                                                 
135   In addition to s pecific duties, the Exchange Act also contains provisions that create risks for 
shareholders who become too closely involved with a portfolio company.  For example, the shareholder 
runs the risk of being found guilty of trading on inside information. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (2000) 
and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  It may also incur liability and restrictions on the transferability of its stock 
as a "controlling shareholder" pursuant to § 15 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77o (2000) the 
"Securities Act"), and liability as a controlling shareholder under § 20 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 78t (2000).  See Coffee, Liquidity vs. Control, supra note 2, at 1345-51.  For a recent discussion of 
these risks, see Eric M. Fogel, David I. Addis & Edward C. Harris, Public Company Shareholders 
Acting as Owners: Three Reforms – Introducing the "Oversight Shareholder", 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 517 
(2004). 
136   This paper will not discuss the numerous duties connected with the solicitation of proxies, except in a 
brief, historical overview presented in Part V. 
137   "Voting power" includes "the power to vote, or to direct the voting of, such security." 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13d-3(a)(1). 
138   "Investment power" includes "the power to dispose, or to direct the disposition of, such security." 17 
C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(2). 
139   Securities must be registered under § 12 of the Exchange Act if either (i) if they are listed on a national 
securities exchange (§ 12(a) Exchange Act) or (ii) if the issuer of the securities has more than 500 
shareholders and total assets exceeding $   10 million (§ 12(g) Exchange Act in connection with 
Exchange Act Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1).  In addition to securities registered under § 12 
Exchange Act, Rule 13d-1 also applies to "any equity security of any insurance company which would 
have been required to be so registered except for the exemption contained in section 12(g)(2)(G) of the 
Act, or any equity security issued by a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(i). 
140   17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a). 
141   17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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Exchange Act,
142 the type of more formal coordination that is actually necessary to have an impact on 
governance could well trigger the requirement.
143  Such application of § 13 Exchange Act to mutual 
consultation and coordination in preparation for an annual meeting  – a prerequisite to effective 
shareholder monitoring – would seem, however, in no way in line with the legislative purpose of this 
provision of the Williams Act.
144 
A Schedule 13D must be filed with the SEC within 10 days after either exceeding the 5% 
threshold or forming a group whose aggregate holdings exceed such threshold.
145  In a Schedule 13D, 
aside from specifying the securities purchased, the shareholder and each member of a group, must file: 
•  Name(s), citizenship(s), place(s) of incorporation and taxpayer identification number(s); 
•  Details regarding any judgments against the shareholder(s) under state or federal securities 
laws or convictions under criminal laws during the last, five years; 
•  The source of funds or other consideration used or to be used in making the purchases as 
required (with a copy of an lending agreements to be attached as an exhibit); 
•  The purpose or purposes of the acquisition of securities, in particular any plans to purchase 
or sell additional securities, effect an extraordinary corporate transaction, such as a merger, 
reorganization, liquidation, or sale of assets, plans to change the composition of the current 
board or management, or amend the company's charter or by-laws, or plans to delist or 
degregister any class of the company's securities; 
•  The aggregate amount of shares beneficially owned (with a breakdown within the group); 
•  A description of any transactions in the class of securities reported on that were effected 
during the past sixty days; and 
•  A description of all contracts and understandings – such as for the purchase, sale, pledge, 
call, put or voting of the securities – among the reporting persons and the company (with a 
copy of any written agreements to be attached as an exhibit).
146 
It is understandable that many shareholders – absent an actual intent to launch a tender offer – 
would prefer to exit by selling their shares or accept the risks of bad management rather than to run the 
risk of having to pay for the preparation of a Schedule 13D in which they are forced to make the above 
disclosures, immediately update the disclosure with each one percent change in the (group's) aggregate 
                                                 
142   Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 110 (7th Cir. 1970).  
143   Evidence of a group for these purposes has been found where there is a common plan and goal, a 
coordination of activities and communications, public expression of a position among the shareholders, 
and parallel and continued purchases of the company's shares during a specific time period.  LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at § 6-D-2.b, note 144, citing Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc. v. Cormier, 
661 F. Supp. 825, 850 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
144   The legislative purpose of this section of the Williams Act is quite clear: "The purpose of this Section 
is to prevent "a group of persons who seek to pool their voting or other interests in the securities of an 
issuer from evading the provisions of the statute because no one individual owns more than [the 
triggering threshold] percent of the securities." S. Rep. No. 550, at 8 (1967); H.R. Rep. No. 1711, at 8-
9 (1968), discussed in LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at § 6-D-2.b, note 137. 
145   17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a); § 240.13d-5(b)(1). 
146   17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, Items 1-7. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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holding,
147 and subject themselves to significant potential liability on the basis of these filings.
148  As 
this rule was adopted to address takeovers, it is difficult to understand why it applies to ordinary 
governance activities. 
An alternative, less intrusive Schedule 13G that must normally be updated only annually was 
made available in 1978 for certain institutional investors who have "acquired such securities in the 
ordinary course of . . . business and not with the purpose nor with the effect of changing or influencing 
the control of the issuer."
149  In 1998, the SEC amended Schedule 13G to expand the form's use 
beyond institutional investors, to other investors, provided that they are "passive".
150  The important 
question for shareholders who desire to participate in governance is, of course, whether the actions that 
would make up monitoring activity constitutes "influencing the control of the issuer."  In its 1998 
release,  the SEC provided some useful guidance on where it sees the line between "passive" and 
"active" investors.  It listed the following factors that would be taken into consideration: 
•  Purchase of securities in the ordinary course of a business that, by its nature, does not seek 
to acquire control of companies indicates passivity;  
                                                 
147   Any "material increase or decrease in the percentage of the class beneficially owned" must promptly be 
disclosed in an amendment to the existing Schedule 13D, and any "acquisition of disposition . . . in an 
amount of one percent or more of the class of securities shall be deemed 'material' for purposes of [the 
Rule]; acquisitions or dispositions of less than those amounts may be material, depending upon the 
facts and circumstances." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a). 
148   Declarations and documents "filed" with the SEC are subject to civil liability for misstatements and 
omissions pursuant to § 18 Exchange Act, as well as the penalties of fine and imprisonment pursuant 
to § 32 Exchange Act.   
149   The adopting release was Final Rules:  Filing And Disclosure Requirements Relating To Beneficial 
Ownership, SEC Release Nos. 33-5925 and 34-14692, 1978 WL 170898 (Apr. 21, 1978) ("Schedule 
13G Adopting Release").  The current requirements are found in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b)(1)(i).  After 
the 1998 amendments discussed below, the passive investors eligible to file Schedule 13G are split into 
two groups. The first group is  certain institutional investors, such as brokers, banks, investment 
companies, investment advisors and employee benefit plans.  When they acquire a holding in the 
ordinary course of business that exceeds 5 % but does not exceed 10 % may file a Schedule 13G within 
45 days after the calendar year in which the holding exceeds the lower threshold, and if the holding 
does exceed 10 % the Schedule 13G must be filed within 10 days after the calendar month in which the 
holding exceeds such threshold. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b).  This group must file an amended Schedule 
13G during the first 45 days of each calendar year if there are any changes (17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(b)), 
and with 10 days after any change of at least 5 %. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(c).  A separate, statutory 
exemption from § 13(d) filings is provided for purchases of securities in connection with an offering 
registered under the Securities Act. See § 13(d)(6)(A) Exchange Act. 
150   Final Rule: Amendments to Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements, SEC Release No. 34-
39538, 63 Fed. Reg. 2854, 2855 (Jan. 16, 1998) ("Schedule 13G Amending Release").  These "passive 
investors" now constitute the second group of investors that qualify to use Schedule 13G.  The group is 
not limited to any particular type of person or entity, but may only  use Schedule 13G if their holdings 
do not exceed 20 % of any class of equity. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(c)(3).  If this threshold is crossed, 
such persons must within 10 days file a Schedule 13D. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(f)(1).  This second group 
must make its initial filing on Schedule 13G within 10 days of exceeding the 5 % threshold (17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13d-1(c)), and must file an amended Schedule 13G during the first 45 days of each calendar year 
if there are any changes (17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(b)), and within 10 days of any change of at least 5 %. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(d). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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•  Submission of or solicitation of support for a shareholder proposal based upon investment 
policies regarding good corporate governance for all of the shareholder's portfolio 
companies, rather than to foster a control transaction for a particular company, indicates 
passivity; 
•  Submission of or solicitation of support for a shareholder proposal under facts and 
circumstances that are likely to have the effect of facilitating a change of control of that 
particular company (for example, submission of a proposal to eliminate a staggered board) 
would indicate disqualifying "activity"; 
•  Submission – without independent solicitation for support – of a proposal would indicate 
passivity; 
•  Submission of or solicitation of support for a shareholder proposal against a proposal put 
forth by management would indicate disqualifying activity; and 
•  Merely voting in favor of a challenger's proposal or making a voting announcement in favor 
of a corporate governance proposal would not cause the loss of Schedule 13G eligibility.
151 
This list is quite helpful for distinguishing between acceptable passivity and disqualifying 
activity as understood by the SEC.  However, it sets a rather low bar, as actions like returning a board 
to its "non-staggered" state so that directors come up for election annually should hardly in all cases 
fall under the activity that the Williams Act is designed to prevent.  Perhaps prompted by the slowly 
rising acceptance of shareholder voice described in Part V, the SEC asked five years later whether the 
possibility of triggering  Schedule 13D reporting requirements currently had a chilling effect on 
shareholders who seek to conduct ordinary monitoring activity, such as organizing a campaign to 
withhold votes from an undesirable candidate for the board.
152  This would seem to indicate that the 
definition of "disqualifying activity" is evolving. 
2. Duties of Insiders under § 16 Exchange Act 
A second set of restrictions imposed by the federal securities laws treats shareholders, directors 
and officers similarly.  Section 16 Exchange Act applies both to "every person who is directly or 
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of any class of any equity security . . . 
registered pursuant to Section 12," and to every person "who is a director or an officer of the issuer of 
such security."
153  This section, which was part of the original Exchange Act, requires the persons 
covered both to report their securities transactions to the SEC and to disgorge to the company any 
profits from purchases or sales in the company's securities made within a six-month period.
154  
Although the 10 % threshold triggering § 16 provides more leeway than the 5 % set in § 13 Exchange 
Act, reaching the threshold triggers an obligation to report holdings in  all types of the issuer's 
                                                 
151   Schedule 13G Amending Release, Id. at 2859. 
152   Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations, SEC Release No. 34–48626, 68 Fed. Reg. 
60784, 60806 (October 14, 2003) ("Security Holder Nominations Proposal"). 
153   15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a)(1). 
154   15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a) and (b); See LOSS & S ELIGMAN, supra note 15, at § 6-E-1, and THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 13 (5
th ed., 2005). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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securities held,
155 not just the class in which the 10 % threshold was reached.  Moreover, the concept 
of a "group" used for § 13(d) Exchange Act also applies to § 16 Exchange Act,
156 and the judicially 
made concept of "deputization" can result in a shareholder being deemed a director of the issuer if it 
elects a director to the board.
157  One can image that the duty of disgorgement could also be 
significantly more disrupting to a shareholder than a reporting requirement.  It is typical of a fiduciary 
duty to require the fiduciary to disgorge profits she obtained from the resources subject to the fiduciary 
relationship.
158  The impact of § 16 Exchange Act, like that of § 13 Exchange Act, is to discourage 
shareholders from building up holdings that could trigger the 10 % threshold.
159  This is regretful, as 
the larger a shareholder's equity interest in a company, the more incentive such shareholder has to 
study company disclosures, responsibly exercise voting rights, and actively participate to ensure 
optimum company performance.
160 
This brief discussion of the fiduciary duties and federal obligations of shareholders shows that 
the characterization of shareholders as unconstrained actors, reigned in by dutiful management, 
contains more polemic than truth.  The following section shows the main reason why the fiduciary 
duties of shareholders are limited:  shareholders  almost never use their residual power as owners.  
Further, one need not examine the actual, empirical state of shareholders to see this weakness, for it 
has been designed into the default structures of American corporate law.  The default governance 
structure offered by corporate law statutes such as the Delaware General Corporation Law and the 
Revised Model Business Corporation Act, in particular when working together with the federal proxy 
rules, deprive shareholders of express legal power to influence the corporation they own, except in the 
most extreme circumstances. 
                                                 
155   LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at §  6-E-2. 
156   See HAZEN, supra note 154, at § 13.3[2][B]. Morales v. Freund, 163 F.3d 793 (2
nd Cir. 1999). 
157   See Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2
nd Cir. 1969) and Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 
(1962). Both cases are discussed in LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at § 6-E-7.b and HAZEN, supra 
note 145, at § 13.3[1][A]. 
158   "While the usual remedy in legal actions is money damages measured by reference to the harm 
incurred by the plaintiff, the remedy most often associated with a breach of fiduciary duty is 
disgorgement of profits.  Disgorgement is measured by the amount of the fiduciary's gain rather than 
by the amount of the beneficiary's loss, implying that the primary goal of providing the remedy is 
deterrence." Smith, supra note 93, at 1493. 
159   See Coffee, Liqudity vs. Control, supra note 2, at 1343. 
160   Michael C. Jensen,  The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control 
Systems, in JENSEN, supra note 109, at 53. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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IV. SHAREHOLDER VOICE IN THE STATUTORY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
Discussion of weak shareholder voice usually focuses on the e mpirical condition of small 
shareholders in U.S. corporations: dispersed, uninformed and uninterested.
161  As a result, intractable 
problems like the cost and complexity of decision-making and the rationality of apathetic inaction 
seemingly render shareholder voice an impractical governance instrument that gains utility only when 
transferred to a takeover bidder.
162  Thus, much of the discussion of shareholder rights has addressed 
the right of shareholders to accept tender offers, and the extent to which management can block such 
offers.
163  Less attention, it seems, has been given to the manner in which corporate statutes allocate 
power between shareholders and management.  As discussed above,
164 shareholders  have  residual 
power that allows them to alter and shape  the governance structure of a stock corporation as they 
choose.  However, this power is rarely used, and in a recent law review article,
165 Prof. Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk has shed welcome light on how the default governance structures supplied by U.S. corporate 
statues place shareholders in a weaker position than is generally understood.  Prof. Bebchuk highlights 
the obvious yet overlooked fact that shareholders do not decide on fundamental corporate matters, but 
only have an occasional right to veto them.
166  This places shareholders in the passive and negative 
position of either accepting management's domination or blocking activity altogether.  When this 
thorough dependence on management is seen in combination with an election process that makes it 
very difficult  for shareholders to either choose or oust management, the structurally determined 
weakness of shareholders becomes clear.  This weakness, which stems from statutory default 
provisions and a practical difficulty in pushing through charter amendments to increase shareholder 
power, as well as from a detrimental interaction of state and federal law, is one reason why the 
opponents of shareholder voice argue that shareholders are not owners.
167  Indeed, these impediments 
to shareholder power should be corrected if we do not intend to wake one day and find that a creeping, 
                                                 
161   See CLARK, supra note 14, at 390-92.  For an excellent discussion of the "empirical" condition of 
shareholders as well as of the constraints that federal law places on shareholder action, see Bernard S. 
Black, Shareholder Passivity Revisited, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990). 
162   See CLARK, supra note 14, at 398. 
163   See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,  Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and 
Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus.Law. 1733 (1981). 
164   See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
165   See Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 21. 
166   See infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
167   "If 'control' is the economically important feature of 'ownership,' then to build a theory of corporations 
on the premise that ownership (and, hence, control) lies with shareholders grossly mischaracterizes the 
legal realities of most public corporations." Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 260. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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historical development has "taken" the entire outstanding share capital of U.S. public corporations and 
placed it in the hands of a communal "team".
168 
A. The Statutory Balance of Power between Shareholders and Management 
Pursuant to § 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, a corporation is managed "by 
or under the direction of the board of directors."
169  This is no different under the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act ("RMBCA").
170  Both statutes provide that shareholders have a residual 
right to remove some or all of this power from the board in the corporate charter.
171  That this right is 
rarely used probably stems from a mixed bag of causes, including efficiency considerations and that 
most shareholders buy into corporations already established,
172 that statutes normally give the board an 
exclusive right to  propose charter amendments in the annual meeting,
173 and  that  boards have no 
interest in making proposals to reduce their own power.
174  If the statutory default structure is not 
customized,  shareholders  are locked  in an exclusively reactive position, as Prof. Lucian Bebchuk 
                                                 
168   This paper does not argue that such a redistribution of ultimate entitlements from those with property 
rights to those who contribute other factors to the company is reprehensible.  However, any such 
redistribution should be accomplished consciously, voluntarily and legally, rather than by a subtle, 
unseen process in which legal theorists slowly chisel away property rights.  If partially incorrect and 
partially confusing assertions regarding shareholder property rights are made often enough by 
respected professionals in respected publications, one court, and then another, could eventually deem 
the property rights of shareholders nonexistent.  We should remember that unfortunate, polemical 
distortions of property rights in the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries brought much unrest and 
unhappiness to significant parts of the globe.  Physicists are not the only scholars whose work can lead 
to bombs. 
169   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a). 
170   § 8.01 RMBCA. 
171   As discussed in Part II.A, the second sentence of § 141(a) allows the certificate of incorporation to 
specify that "the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter" 
shall be exercised "to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate 
of incorporation." Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (emphasis added).  § 8.01 RMBCA provides: "All 
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the 
corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in 
the articles of incorporation or in an agreement authorized under section" (emphasis added).  On the 
Delaware provision, Franklin Balotti and Jesse Finkelstein comment: "Use of the special provisions 
relating to close corporations is not the only example of arrangements which may be made to provide 
for a form of management other than that carried out by or under the direction of the board.  
Shareholders' agreements are commonplace in "regular" corporations (i.e., those not formed as close 
corporations) as well. Moreover, even in regular corporations the certificate could provide for special 
management measures.  " R. F RANKLIN BALOTTI & J ESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 7.57 (2002). 
172   About four-fifths of the S&P 500 went public before 1985. See Bebchuk, supra note 21, at 866. 
173   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1), and § 10.03 RMBCA. 
174   If a number of possible amendments could be proposed, the proposal actually selected "will be very 
much influenced by which change would best serve management's interests." Bebchuk,  Shareholder 
Power, supra note 21, at 862.  For a detailed discussion of the power dynamics in making charter 
amendments and the board's reluctance to enact amendments that decrease their own power,  see 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on 
Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1820-25 (1989). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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explains: "A central and well-settled principle of U.S. corporate law is that all major corporate 
decisions must be initiated by the board.  Shareholders may not initiate any such decisions."
175  Like 
being in an automobile with only brakes, but no steering wheel or accelerator, this veto power lends 
shareholders only a very imperfect influence on corporate affairs (aside from jumping out before the 
crash).  As Prof. Bebchuck explains: 
Shareholders' veto power prevents the adoption of changes that would make shareholders 
worse off than they would be under the status quo.  Veto power is thus a "negative" 
power that precludes any worsening of the shareholders' situation.  This power, however, 
cannot ensure that rule changes that could increase shareholder value will take place.  In 
particular, when management disfavors a value-increasing change for self-interested 
reasons, shareholders' veto power will not enable them to obtain this change.
176  
The result is that for decisions on such major structural changes as mergers or consolidations,
177 
or sales, leases or exchanges of all or substantially all of the corporation's property and assets other 
than in the ordinary course of business,
178 the board has sole authority to propose or exclude the matter 
from a shareholder vote,
179 and, in the case of a sale, lease or exchange of assets under Delaware law, 
the board need not consummate the transaction even after the shareholders have voted to approve it.
180  
The default provisions of U.S. corporate law statutes also give the board almost unrestricted discretion 
on whether a primary economic right of the shareholders – the right to receive dividends – will be 
fulfilled in individual cases.
181  This lack of shareholder authority creates significant agency problems 
by allowing directors to stockpile cash that they can use for unprofitable empire-building or otherwise 
misuse.
182  It is doubtful that this m oral hazard could be completely eliminated by shareholder 
introduction of a general policy on the distribution of dividends. 
Given these circumstances and a growing need to exercise some influence over their 
investments, shareholders have resorted to a somewhat ragged assortment of improvisations in 
attempts to gain influence over, rather than simply exiting, their corporations.  One type of available 
                                                 
175   Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 21, at 836. 
176   Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 21, at 862. 
177   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251(c), and § 11.04(b) RMBCA. 
178   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 271(a), and § 12.02 RMBCA.  The board alone may sell or lease the 
corporation's assets in the ordinary course of business. § 12.01 RMBCA. 
179   Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 21, at 889. 
180   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 271(b). 
181   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 170(a), and § 6.40(a) RMBCA.  The Delaware Court of Chancery held, for 
example, in Leibert v. Grinnell Corp., 194 A.2d 846 (Del. Ch. 1963), that stockholders may not force 
directors to declare dividends even in the face of a large surplus and a charter provision emphasizing a 
corporate purpose to receive and distribute dividends. 
182   See Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 21, at 903-906, citing numerous empirical studies that 
confirm a tendency of management to build empires with excess cash rather than distributing it to 
shareholders. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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voice is indistinguishable from a mass exit.  Although the dissolution of the corporation normally 
follows the standard procedure of board recommendation and shareholder vote,
183 it is possible under 
Delaware law for shareholders acting unanimously to place a corporation into dissolution.
184  Two 
other types of voice are second-best solutions.  As shareholders may not themselves initiate a charter 
amendment in the shareholder meeting, they may attempt to achieve similar results by amending the 
hierarchically lower by-laws.
185  Although it is debated just how far the by-laws can be stretched, given 
their nature and function, it is likely that their power is limited to forward looking, general rules that 
set up procedural requirements not in conflict with the law or the certificate of incorporation.
186  
Another way that shareholders have attempted to hammer their ploughshares into swords is by making 
mere recommendations, or "precatory" proposals to be included in proxy materials pursuant to Rule 
14a-8 under the Exchange Act.
187  Such proposals are often formulated as by-laws amendments and 
often seek to remove defences to takeovers or increase board independence.
188  Boards routinely ignore 
such proposals, even when they address matters far from ordinary management, such dismantling 
staggered boards to ensure that the entire board will stand for election each year, and even when a 
                                                 
183   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 275(a), and § 14.02 RMBCA. 
184   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 275(c). 
185   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §   109, and  § 10.20 RMBCA.  The Delaware provision is used in two 
additional states and the Model Act provision is used in 23 additional states. JONATHAN R. MACEY, 
MACEY ON CORPORATIONS, 2002, § 3.06[B].  Delaware courts regard by-laws generally "as the proper 
place for self-imposed rules and regulations deemed expedient for [the corporation's] convenient 
functioning" as opposed to the certificate of incorporation, which "is an instrument in which the broad 
and general aspects of the corporate entity's existence and nature are defined." Gow v. Consolidated 
Coppermines Corp., 165 A. 136, 140 (Del. Ch. 1933). 
186   See John C. Coffee, The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control 
Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605, 614 (1997).  
187   17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.  Management may exclude a shareholder proposal from its proxy materials for 
a number of reasons, including when the proposal would be improper under state law because, for 
example, it conflicted with a statutory allocation of power.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1).  In a note to 
this section, the SEC has explained: "Depending on the subject matter, some proposals are not 
considered proper under state law if they would be binding on the company if approved by 
shareholders. In our experience, most proposals that are cast as recommendations or requests that the 
board of directors take specified action are proper under state law. Accordingly, we will assume that a 
proposal drafted as a recommendation or suggestion is proper unless the company demonstrates 
otherwise." 
188   See Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of 
Corporate Governance, in  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: C ONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 507 
(Joseph A McCahery, et al., eds., 2002).  The line separating acceptable proposals to enhance board 
independence from those that may be excluded under Rule 14a-8 is a fine one.  For example, the SEC 
reports that it did not allow management to exclude a Rule 14a-8 proposal to amend the by-laws of 
General Motors Corp. to require "a transition to independent directors for each seat on the audit, 
compensation and nominating committees as openings occur." SEC Division of Corporation Finance, 
Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, "Shareholder Proposals" 7 (July 13, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal.shtml.  In this way, shareholders were able to take measures against 
insider entrenchment in the key committees of GM's board of directors.  However, as a former head of 
the SEC Division of Corporate Finance reports, the SEC policy regarding exclusion is somewhat 
uncertain, See Linda C. Quinn & Ottilie L. Jarmel, The Shareholder Proposal Process, in PRACTICAL 
GUIDE, supra note 17, at 15-15 et. seq. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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proposal is adopted again and again by a majority of the shareholders.
189  Managerialists are wont to 
call such recommendations "reform at gunpoint" stirred up by "activists."
190  Given the central role of 
public investment in the U.S. economy and the professional calibre of the parties involved, it is 
saddening to see corporate governance at its highest level revolve around by-law provisions hopefully 
stretched to resemble charter rules and "recommendations" iterated in the hope of shaming 
management into action. 
One instrument that perhaps has potential, although it still faces certain logistical limitations, is 
the written consent.  Although the RMBCA requires unanimous action in all cases where consents are 
used,
191 the Delaware General Corporation Law provides that, "any action required . . . to be taken at 
any annual or special meeting of stockholders . . . may be taken without a meeting . . . if a consent or 
consents in writing . . . shall be signed by the holders of outstanding stock having not less than the 
minimum number of votes that would be necessary to authorize or take such action at a meeting. . . 
."
192  Shareholders are free to solicit consents in complete independence of the board and without 
giving any requirement of prior notice.  There are three statutory disadvantages to action by consents.  
First, the power to act by consents can be eliminated in the charter.
193  Second, unless the action by 
consent fills "all of the directorships to which directors could be elected at an annual meeting" at the 
time of the consent, unanimous action is required to elect directors to the board.
194  Third, the 
denominator used to calculate whether a required majority has been reached is "all shares entitled to 
vote" on the particular issue,
195 which could well be higher than the normal denominator of shares 
present in person or by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the relevant matter.
196  However, it 
should be noted that this is comparable to the majority required at a meeting to approve mergers and 
asset sales.
197  Aside from these limitations, "the statute creates a right in stockholders to act 
                                                 
189   Prof. Bebcuk provides empirical evidence gathered by the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
showing that although resolutions to eliminate staggered boards were repeatedly adopted during the 
period between 1997 and 2003, boards refused to implement more than two-thirds of the resolutions 
adopted.  Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 21, at 854. 
190   See  Andrew R. Brownstein & Igor Kirman,  Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? 
Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions, 60 Bus. Law. 23, 45 (2004). 
191   See § 7.04(a) RMBCA. 
192   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 228(a). 
193   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 228(a).  Because if directors seriously believed that, in spite of the logistical 
difficulties, written consents offered shareholders a realistic avenue to circumvent their monopoly over 
the decision-making process, they would likely propose to amend the charter to remove consents, the 
possibility of using consents should probably be a mandatory provision. 
194   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 211(b). 
195   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 228(a). 
196   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 216. 
197   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §   251(c) requires approval by "majority of the outstanding stock of the 
corporation entitled to vote thereon" to approve a merger, and Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 271(a) requires 
approval by the same majority. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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independently of the directors upon whom they might otherwise be dependent to call a meeting."
198  
Thus, combined with the right of access to the list of stockholders for the purpose of communicating 
with them,
199 and the speed and cost-effectiveness of email consents,
200 it would seem that the use of 
consents would offer a powerful tool for shareholders to take some initiative.  The drawback comes 
from market structure rather than corporate law.  Because of the relatively old-fashioned way that 
shares are currently horded in the vaults of depositories, with entitlements to the shares filtered through 
the accounts of banks and brokers, it  is  extremely difficult and time consuming to find out who 
shareholders are and how to contact them, which would make efficient solicitation very difficult.
201  
Moreover, although Delaware law has designed consents as a tool to assist quick shareholder action, 
the entire body of federal proxy rules applies to consents just as to proxies, which means that the 
solicitation of consents for registered companies must comply with the timing requirements and incur 
at least some of the costs of a proxy solicitation.
202  Consents do not yet appear to have become a tool 
that is commonly used to influence corporate governance. 
Given the structural and practical hurdles placed in the way of shareholder action in U.S. 
corporations, much depends on the skill, loyalty and character of corporate directors.  This greatly 
amplifies the importance of a shareholder's right to elect directors.  The following section discusses the 
exercise of this right, which is also much less than it might seem. 
B. The Election of Directors 
Since a corporation rests squarely in the control of its board of directors, the shareholders' main 
avenue of influence would be to choose who sits on that board.  The law tells us that directors 
appointed for full terms receive their seats on the board by shareholder vote.
203  This should mean that 
shareholders have significant influence on the composition of the board.  Yet this "is largely a myth.  
                                                 
198   EDWARD P. W ELCH & A NDREW J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 
§ 228.3 (2002). 
199   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220, and its interpretation in The Conservative Caucus Research Analysis 
& Education Foundation, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., 525 A.2d 569 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
200   Consents may be delivered by "electronic transmission." See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 228(d)(1). 
201   On the impediments created by the indirect holding system, see LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at 
§ 6-C-6 and  Task Force on Shareholder Proposals of the Committee on Federal Regulation of 
Securities, Section of the Business Law  of the American Bar Association, "Report on Proposed 
Changes in Proxy Rules and Regulations Regarding Procedures for the Election of Corporate 
Directors," 59  BUS. L AW 109, 117-17 (2003).  Delaware courts have strictly required that record 
holders, as opposed to actual beneficiary owners, sign written consents.  See WELCH & TUREZYN, supra 
note 198, at § 228.4.  Although the proxy rules created to assist procuring necessary authorizations 
from both record and beneficial shareholders (17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-13, 14b-1 and 14b-2) also apply to 
consents, the effectiveness of this system is, even in the case of proxy solicitations, questionable and 
costly. 
202   See  R. F RANKLIN  BALOTTI  & J OSEPH  J. B ODNAR, S OLICITATION OF  WRITTEN  CONSENTS, PLI 
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 185 (1987). 
203   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 211(b), and § 7.28(a) RMBCA. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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Attempts to replace directors are extremely rare, even in firms that systematically under-perform over 
a long period of time.  By and large, directors nominated by the company run unopposed and their 
election is thus guaranteed.  The key for a director's re-election is remaining on the firm's slate."
204  
Access to the firm's slate of director candidates is, moreover, controlled by the board, and the presence 
of independent directors on a board nominating committee fails to provide comfort exactly in those 
cases when it is most needed: when shareholders mistrust the board and wish to appoint new 
members.
205  The  default mechanism for nominating  candidates, while it is designed to encourage 
management to act wisely for shareholders, effectively eliminates shareholder input, and the type of 
vote with which the candidates are elected ensures that whomever is nominated will be elected. 
Unless the company's certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, directors are elected by a 
"plurality" of the votes present at a meeting.
206  A "plurality" of the votes means the largest portion of 
votes cast.
207  Current proxy regulations do not provide for alternative candidates to be listed for a 
given board position; the card allows the shareholder to either vote for management's candidate or 
"withhold" his vote for such position.
208  This means that when no alternative candidate is available, 
which is the rule absent a proxy contest, any vote at all for the listed candidate constitutes a winning 
plurality.  Prof. Joseph Grundfest provides a graphic illustration of the point: under a plurality rule, if 
"a million shares count as a quorum, and if 999,999 ballots strike your name out and say no, you, as 
the director, owning only one share, and you vote for yourself, congratulations, you win. You have the 
plurality."
209  The effects of plurality voting creates a real need for alternative candidates on the ballot.  
                                                 
204   Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 90, at 45 et seq., citing a study performed on proxy contests 
held by listed companies between 1996 and 2002, which showed that on an average only two contests 
were run each year for companies with market capitalization exceeding $ 200 million. 
205   Id., at 49.  The domination of the nomination process by incumbent management is well known and 
documented.  See CLARK, supra note 14, at 109 ("It is a notorious fact that in the over-whelming 
majority of elections for directorships in public corporations the public shareholders simply vote for 
whomever is proposed by the corporation's nominating committee. At least in the past . . . . Nominees 
tended to be agreeable, chummy persons, usually of the same social class as the incumbents. . . . This 
characterization frequently had to be qualified, however, when the corporation had a large shareholder 
whose director-representatives were really looking out for that shareholder's interest."); Task Force on 
Shareholder Proposals, supra note 44, at 118; MONKS & MINOW, supra note 21, at 212 et seq., and Leo 
E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law Implications of the 
Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1377 (2002). 
206   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 216, and § 7.28(a) RMBCA. 
207   "Plurality. A large number or quantity that does not constitute a majority; a number greater than 
another, regardless of the margin . . . ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1176 (7
th ed, 1999). 
208   17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2). 
209   Remarks of Prof. Joseph Grundfest in "Symposium on Corporate Elections", 95 (Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
ed., Nov. 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=471640.  A recent ISS white paper reports that a 
task force of the American Bar Association and a working group of corporations and labor pension 
funds have been set up to study the possibility of introducing majority – as opposed to plurality – voting 
for the election of directors.  INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR 
ELECTIONS: F ROM THE  SYMBOLIC TO THE  DEMOCRATIC 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.issproxy.com/governance/whitepapers.jsp. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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As the system currently stands,  shareholders have no opportunity to contest the election of a 
management candidate unless they become a "dissident", and pay for the distribution of proxy 
materials for an alternative list of candidates.
210 
The fault in the nomination system does not lie in state law.  Delaware law allows shareholders 
to nominate candidates for election to the board either on the floor of the meeting itself,
211 or through a 
nomination notice that is given to the board and distributed by the board to the other shareholders.
212  
Moreover, shareholders may use a campaign for written consents to propose and elect a new slate of 
directors.
213  The primary restriction placed on the use of consents to nominate and elect directors is 
that a unanimous vote is required if less than all of the directors that could be elected at the meeting 
replaced by the consents are in fact elected.
214  Thus Delaware law contains neither an express nor an 
implied policy against allowing shareholders to nominate candidates for the board of their company.  
However, once a Delaware corporation becomes subject to the registration requirements of §   12 
Exchange Act, the rudimentary requirements of state law for the calling of a shareholders' meeting
215 
are preempted by the proxy rules issued under  § 14 Exchange Act.
216  F or an annual meeting, 
                                                 
210   The argument is sometimes raised that the "withholding" of votes is by itself a "very potent weapon" 
against management. Remarks of Martin Lipton in Symposium on Corporate Elections,  Id. at 22. 
However, the strength of such message depends not on any binding nature of withholding the vote, but 
only on how management might interpret its effect on their reputations, which in turn depends on the 
current understanding of shareholder rights.  The case of Walt Disney Co. presents a good example.  
At its 2004 shareholders' meeting, votes withheld from the much criticized Michael Eisner exceeded 
42 % of votes cast, yet the only reaction was to replace him as chairman with one of his closest allies, 
and to announce that he would step down from his CEO position two years later, at the normal 
expiration of his contract in 2006.  See  INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2004 P OSTSEASON 
REPORT 5, available at  http://www.issproxy.com/governance/issreports/index.jsp.  It appears that any 
reaction at all to a withhold campaign must be interpreted as a victory, but it certainly is not a "very 
potent weapon." 
211   BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 171, at § 7.57. 
212   This procedure is discussed in Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 96 (Del Supr., 1992). See also Millenco 
L.P. v. meVC Draper Fischer Jurvetson Fund I, Inc. 824 A.2d 11, 19 (Del.Ch., 2002) ("the 'right of 
shareholders to participate in the voting process includes the right to nominate an opposing slate'") and 
Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enterprises, Inc., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 11779, at 12-13. 
213   See note 192 supra and accompanying text, as well as Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 211(b), and BALOTTI & 
FINKELSTEIN, supra note 171, at § 7.31, citing Pabst Brewing Co. v. Jacobs, 549 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Del. 
1982). 
214   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 211(b). 
215   Pursuant to Delaware law, for example, the directors must call the annual meeting within a certain 
time frame (Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §   211), and provide adequate notice of the meeting to the 
shareholders (Del.  Code Ann. tit. 8, §   222(a)).  Notice to an annual meeting need not specify the 
meeting's purpose if proxies are not solicited (Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del Supr., 1992)), but 
such specification is necessary where the meeting is called for a specific transaction. (Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 8, § 222(a)).  Notice must be given at least 10 days before the meeting (Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, 
§ 222(b)), but the date of the meeting cannot be used to disenfranchise shareholders. Schnell v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. Supr., 1971). 
216   17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 – 14a-15. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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management must prepare a proxy statement on Schedule 14A,
217 containing extensive information on 
the company and the candidates, file it with the SEC, and provide it to any person from whom a proxy 
is solicited.
218  There is no provision to allow inclusion of shareholder nominations, even if such right 
exists under state law.  A proposal to allow some nominations by shareholders in certain situations, 
briefly discussed below,
219 would not significantly alter this situation. 
Aside from hoping that the disclosure of nominating committee practices in Schedule 14A
220 will 
shame management into occasionally accepting a shareholder nominee, how can shareholders exercise 
their right, existing under Delaware law, to nominate candidates of their choice?  Rule 14a-8 would 
seem to be a logical avenue, as it allows shareholders who meet specified holding requirements to 
include a proposal and brief supporting statement in the company's proxy materials.
221  This is 
especially true because the Rule was originally designed to "to assure to the stockholders . . . those 
rights that he has traditionally had under State law."
222  Nevertheless, one of the express grounds for 
excluding a shareholder proposal under Rule 14-8 is if it relates to "election for membership on the 
company’s board of directors or analogous governing body."
223  In this way, the state law right to 
nominate a candidate for the board is frustrated by a federal law requirement that excludes such a 
nomination from the primary document through which it realistically could be made.  As Prof. Jill 
Fisch explained in 1993: 
In spite of congressional concern in 1934 that corporate insiders controlled the election 
process, a concern to which the proxy regulations appear to be addressed, insider 
domination of t he election process remains pervasive today. The continued ability of 
corporate insiders to control director elections can be attributed, in part, to deficiencies in 
the federal proxy rules. The proxy rules both have failed to provide affirmative access for 
shareholders to participate in the nomination process and have thwarted shareholder 
attempts at participation."
 224 
                                                 
217   17 C.F.R. § 240.101. 
218   17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a). 
219   See Part V. 
220   See 17 C.F.R. § 240.101, Item 7.  Disclosure requirements regarding the nominating committee are 
discussed in Part V.B.8, infra. 
221   In order to qualify to submit a proposal, a shareholder must "have continuously held at least $2,000 in 
market value, or 1%, of the company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for 
at least one year by the date" it submits the proposal, and continue to hold such securities through the 
date of the meeting. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(b)(1). 
222   Remarks of SEC Chairman Ganson Purcell, Security and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules, 
Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 before the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 172 (1943), quoted and discussed in Jill E. Fisch, From 
Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1142 (1993). 
223   17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(8). 
224   Fisch, supra note 222, at 1162-63. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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This leaves shareholders who desire to nominate a candidate for election to the board with few 
options prior to the meeting: they can either seek "informal" contact with the board, relying on its 
generous cooperation,
225 or launch a proxy contest in which they pay both for the printing and 
distribution of their own proxy materials and bear a portion of the impact of their opponents' spending 
on efforts against them (which will be funded by the corporation whose shares they hold).
226  Such 
contests are rarely conducted to replace management outside of the takeover context.
227  Proxy contests 
also present a "public good" problem because they are financed by a single shareholder or group of 
shareholders, yet benefit all shareholders, thereby forcing the active shareholder to become the 
benefactor of all other, "free riding" shareholders.
228  Reimbursement of a challenger's costs is 
possible, but the law on the question displays a troublesome twist.  A challenger may be reimbursed 
for a contest run for "policy" questions as opposed to one merely seeking to oust the board,
229 but the 
challenger may not vote itself reimbursement unless it does in fact oust the board.
230  Providing access 
to the company's proxy machinery would reduce these costs for the active shareholder,
231 but the 
management lobby fiercely defends the status quo.
232  The result, as the Vice Chancellor of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, Leo Strine, has noted in a law review article, is that the "proxy 
mechanism is titled heavily in favour of the management slate,"
233 which of course raises questions 
about "a corporate election process that is so heavily biased towards incumbents and their self-chosen 
                                                 
225   Messrs Lipton and Rosenblum stress the virtues of informal collaboration as opposed to shareholder 
entitlement. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 28, at 84. Any "voluntary" or "informal" cooperation 
that takes place in any kind of negotiations for anything of value always take place against the 
background of the legal rights of each party.  This is just as true for corporate governance as for 
settlement negotiations in the litigation context.  Indeed, while the threat of adopting a rule to allow 
shareholders to nominate a limited number of candidates for the board was being considered, the 
"voluntary" cooperation of management in such negotiations skyrocketed.  See  INSTITUTIONAL 
SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 210, at 5. 
226   See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at § 6-C-1. 
227   In a study of proxy contests conducted by all listed companies between 1996 and 2002, in the 
companies studied over a period of seven years, only 80 companies experienced proxy contests to 
replace management outside of the takeover context.  See Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 90, 
at 45-46. 
228   Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 90, at 45; also see Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Perspective 
on Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors, 59 BUS. LAW. 95, 99 (2003). 
229   Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 171 A. 226, 227 (Del. Ch. 1934). 
230   See Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. NY, 1950), where Judge Rifkind happily overcame the 
"policy" / "personnel" divide by observing: "The simple fact, of course, is that generally policy and 
personnel do not exist in separate compartments. A change in personnel is sometimes indispensable to 
a change of policy. A new board may be the symbol of the shift in policy as well as the means of 
obtaining it."  90 F. Supp. at 608. 
231   See Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 90, at 47, and Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A 
Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1073, [•] (1990). 
232   See  comments submitted on the Security Holders Nominations Proposal, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903.shtml. 
233   Strine, supra note 8, at 1377. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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successors."
234  This frustration of the shareholder franchise is particularly disturbing when one 
considers that such franchise is supposed to be "the ideological underpinning upon which the 
legitimacy of directorial power rests."
235 
The trends of ownership and rules controlling shareholder voice seem to indicate, however, that 
this situation will not endure forever.  As shareholder sophistication has increased in recent decades, 
the law has gradually adapted to the changing circumstances.  The following section briefly sketches 
some of these developments. 
VI. THE GRADUAL RETURN OF SHAREHOLDER VOICE 
A. An Increase in Institutional Investors 
The picture presented by Professors Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in 1932,
236 of dispersed, 
isolated, and uninterested shareholders has gradually given way to a market structure in which the 
majority of investors are well-organized professionals.  As Prof. Melvin Eisenberg pointed out more 
than thirty years ago,
237 and as the business and academic communities widely discussed in the 
1990s,
238 the American public increasingly invests through intermediaries, so that financial institutions 
like pension and mutual funds are becoming the primary shareholders on the U.S. markets.
239  That 
financial institutions may play a larger role in some other markets, such as in Germany,
240 does not 
negate the changes that have taken place in the U.S. economy.  The following table shows the holdings 
of institutions in U.S. corporate equities between 1960 and 2004: 
                                                 
234   Id., at 1397. 
235   Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corporation, 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch., 1988).  Also  see MM 
Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126 (Del. 2003). 
236   BERLE & MEANS, supra note 36, at 8. 
237   "The short of the matter is that at the present time one-third of the stock in corporations listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange is held by highly sophisticated investors . . . ." Melvin A. Eisenberg, The 
Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CAL. L. REV. 
1, 53 (1969). 
238   See e.g., Back, Passivity, supra note 161, at 567-69; Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 2, at 
827-29, and Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 18, at 847-49. 
239   See ROBERT A.G. MONKS, THE NEW GLOBAL INVESTORS Ch. 5 (2001). 
240   See Coffee, Liquidity vs. Control, supra note 2, at 1302-1306, and FARIZIO BARCA & MARCO BECHT, 
THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE 143 (2001). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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End of period, U.S. dollars in billions 
Sector  1960  1970  1990  2000  2004 
Private pension funds  16.5  67.1  605.9  1915.0  1,690.0 
State & local pension funds  0.6  10.1  284.6  1,223.1  1204.7 
Federal pension funds  0.0  0.0  0.3  56.6  99.3 
Life insurance companies  5.0  14.6  81.9  891.9  1091.5 
Other insurance companies  7.5  13.2  79.9  194.3  209.0 
Bank personal trusts  0.0  87.9  190.1  356.8  223.4 
Mutual funds  14.8  39.7  233.2  3,227.3  3697.2 
Closed-end funds  5.0  4.3  16.2  36.6  81.4 
Exchange-traded funds  0.0  0.0  0.0  65.6  217.7 
Foreign sector  9.3  27.2  243.8  1,643.2  1906.1 
Total equity held by U.S. institutions  58.7  264.1  1,735.0  9,610.4  10,420.3 
Brokers and dealers  0.5  2.0  9.6  77.2  125.3 
Commercial and savings banks  1.3  2.9  11.0  36.1  48.0 
State and local governments  0.0  0.0  4.8  97.1  89.1 
Households & nonprofit organizations  359.8  562.3  1770.1  7,806.2  6521.6 
Total equities outstanding  420.3  831.2  3,531.3  17,627.0  17,204.4 
% of total equity held by U.S. 
institutions 
13.9%  31.8%  49.1%  54.5%  60.6% 
% of total equity held by households & 
nonprofit organizations 
85.6%  67.6%  41.4%  44.3%  37.9% 
Source: Federal Reserve Board, "Flow of Fund Accounts of the United States"
241 
From this, we see that the percentage of total equity held by U.S. institutions increased from 13.9 % 
about the time that Dean Manning expressed his opinions in 1958 regarding "the faceless mass of 
small stockholders,"
242 to 31.8 % shortly after Prof. Eisenberg first flagged the growing concentration 
of equity ownership in 1969,
243 to 49.1 % about the time that the academic literature began to focus 
significant attention on the phenomenon in the early 1990s.
244  During the same period, the holdings of 
                                                 
241   BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, 1955-1964, 1965-1974, 1985-1994, 1995-2004 page 82, 
Corporate Equities (Mar. 10, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/ 
data.htm.  The Federal Reserve figures do not provide a breakdown showing the amount of corporate 
equities that commercials banks, savings banks and brokers manage rather than simply hold (with 
voting rights passed through to their customers).  Excluding these groups from the category of 
institutional investors for purposes of this table shows a lower percentage of holding for institutions 
than a more accurate breakdown might yield.  If the categories of commercial and savings banks and 
brokers and dealers were counted as "institutions" for 2004, the percentage of institutional holdings 
would be the slightly higher figure of 61.6 %.  On the other hand, a significant percentage of the "bank 
personal trusts" may pass through the voting rights of the shares held in trust to the trust beneficiary, 
which would render proxy voting decisions more "individual" than "institutional". 
242   See Manning, supra note 27, at 1489. 
243   See Eisenberg, supra note 237. 
244   Prof. John Coffee, using the then current terminology of Thomas Kuhn, aptly referred to this swing of 
attention toward institutions as a "paradigm shift": "While the old paradigm saw the structure of the 
corporation as the product of a Darwinian competition in which the most efficient design emerged 
victorious, this new perspective sees political forces as constraining that evolutionary process and 
possibly foreclosing the adoption of a superior organizational form. Thus, my colleague Professor Mark 
Roe has argued that the Berle/Means corporation, in which ownership and control are separated, was 
not 'an inevitably natural consequence' of the economic and technological forces that shaped modern 
capitalism, but rather was an adaptation to political forces that limited the scale, scope, and power of 
financial institutions.  Absent these politically imposed constraints, he suggests, the evolution of the 
modern corporation might have resulted in the emergence of a very different dominant organizational Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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households (and non-profit organizations)
245 dropped from 85.5 % to 44.3 %.  At the end of fiscal year 
2004, the holdings of institutions stood at 60.6 % and those of households stood at 37.9 %.  This is a 
very significant reversal over the period. 
This gradual shift towards a market structure in which shareholders have the skills and 
organization to exercise voice on questions of corporate policy and governance has, as discussed in the 
previous section, not yet brought about significant changes in the actual, legal influence they 
exercise.
246  However, during this period, shareholders have gradually returned to at least striking 
range of influence, and it looks something like the second half of a "fall and rise" of shareholder voice 
in the 20
th century.  Prof. Jill Fisch described the first half (the "fall") as follows: 
The role of the shareholder as an owner of the corporation underwent a dramatic change 
in the first half of the twentieth century. Although shareholders originally had ultimate 
authority to control the corporation, this power was taken from them through a variety of 
means, such as disappearance of the common-law right of shareholders to remove 
directors a t will, reduction of the number of transactions that required unanimous 
shareholder approval, increased judicial deference to directors' business judgment and a 
refusal to permit shareholder challenges to the exercise of that judgment, and a growing 
view that shareholders had more or less permanently delegated managerial power over the 
corporation and could not exercise such power directly. . . . The disempowerment of the 
shareholder may have contributed to the abuses that predated the stock market crash of 
1929. In assessing the abuses to which federal regulation should be addressed, Congress 
identified the ability of corporate insiders to use their power to take advantage of 
investors as a primary problem. Some of these practices became the explicit target of the 
federal legislation.
247 
This legislation  – primarily the Securities Act and the Exchange Act  – took steps toward 
reinstating investors in a position of influence by giving them information in the contexts of public 
offerings, annual meetings and at regular intervals.  An extensive body of case law has grown up 
around these rules on civil liability for faulty disclosure and outright fraud.  Nevertheless, the 
movement of shareholders toward a return to real influence has been gradual and in patches faltering.  
As discussed in Part IV, state corporate statues, which in principle give shareholders complete control 
through charter amendments, in practice leave shareholders essentially powerless, especially when 
combined with the federal proxy rules.  One reason for the very slow return of voice has been the 
                                                                                                                                                 
form, one more nearly resembling the Japanese or German industrial system in which financial 
institutions are the major shareholders of, and closely monitor, industrial corporations." Coffee, 
Liquidity vs. Control, supra note 2, at 1278-79. 
245   According to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, non-profit organizations make up 
about 6 % of the total given for this category.  See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM, G UIDE TO THE  FLOW OF  FUNDS  ACCOUNTS, V OLUME  2  Table F - 100, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/fofguide.pdf. 
246   Prof. John Coffee has provided an excellent analysis of many reasons why institutional investors do not 
engage more aggressively in monitoring, such as the differing needs and horizons of different 
institutional investors, the nature of fund manager contracts, and the market's view of activism.  See 
Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 18, at 843-71. 
247   Fisch, supra note 222, at 1137-38. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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market's preference for shareholder "exit" over "voice" (shareholder monitoring), which is usually 
referred to as the work of "activists". 
In 1994, Prof Coffee summed up the practical perspective of a fund manager that had angered a 
client by failing to exercise voting rights: "Better to lose an existing client, it may feel, than to acquire 
an activist reputation that deters dozens of potential clients."
248  This would indicate that an increase in 
the market's acceptance of shareholder voice could reduce a significant deterrent to its practice; if the 
gadfly stigma were turned into a sign of muscular responsibility, voice would no longer deter potential 
clients, but rather attract them.  Although the problem  of free riding competitors still remains, ten 
years after Prof. Coffee's observation, The Wall Street Journal reported: "Calpers soon will issue its 
2004 list of underachievers and, if past performances serves as any guide, it could contain some big 
'buy'  signals for investors."
249  "Calpers", the California Public Employees' Retirement System, 
annually publishes a "focus list" of those portfolio companies that they consider to be 
underperforming, and on which they plan to focus attention – normally regarding corporate governance 
mechanisms or executive compensation  – in the shareholders' meeting.
250  Because the utility of a 
corporate governance mechanism may not differ substantially in comparable companies, institutions 
like Calpers can reap savings on evaluating the implementation of such measures through economies of 
scale, and it will be the cost and the effectiveness of voice itself that will determine whether they will 
take corrective action.  The availability and effectiveness of mechanisms for shareholder voice will 
greatly affect this cost-benefit calculus.  The steadily growing concentration of voting power in the 
hands of institutions has created pressure for reforming the tools of shareholder voice.  This historical 
trend appears also to be tied to a  subtle shift away from the tools that best serve small, private 
shareholders and an occasional raider, such as litigation
251 and takeovers,
252 and towards corporate 
"political" mechanisms that emphasize voice.
253 
                                                 
248   Id. at 863. 
249   Robin Sidel,  'Calpers Effect' May Boost Stocks: Underachievers Identified By Big Fund Often 
Rebound By Posting Solid Returns, Wall St. J. Europe, Apr. 20, 2004 at M1. 
250   For a summary of Calpers investment policies and historical on recent "focus lists,"  see CALIFORNIA 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, "Facts At A Glance: Corporate Governance," available at 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/corpgov.pdf. 
251   The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. No. 104-67) was promulgated to reduce 
the number of abusive law suits filed against heavily capitalized persons to seek compensation for 
losses from bad investments and raised the hurdles for plaintiffs in a securities fraud action.  Although 
it is highly doubtful that the Court was reacting to this trend, the Supreme Court's decision in Central 
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 128 L.Ed 2d 119 (1994), read the 
language of §   10 Exchange Act as restricting actions for securities fraud to primary actors who 
themselves commit fraud, thereby eliminating actions for aiding and abetting.  This also reduced the 
reach of shareholder litigation.  Neither of these changes was reversed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002.  As between small and large shareholders, however, the suit for a breach of fiduciary duty, 
discussed in Part III.A, remains to safeguard against breaches of duty among joint owners. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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B. Reforms That Are Slowly Making Voice Viable 
1. Ensuring the Distribution of Proxy Materials 
Before shareholders can exercise voting rights, they have to know that a meeting is being held.  
As many shareholders are beneficial owners whose brokers, banks or central depositories are entered 
as holder of record in the stockholder register, and who are thus unknown to the corporation, simply 
sending information regarding the annual meeting is a challenge.  The 1963 case of Walsh and Levine 
v. Peoria and Eastern Railway Company
254 exemplifies why it was necessary to put some crude 
mechanisms in place to help proxy disclosures reach shareholders.  Challengers launched a proxy 
contest, sent one copy of proxy materials to each name they found on the stockholder list, and trusted 
brokers – according to a supposed "custom" in the brokerage community – to notify them if more 
copies of the materials were necessary to allow beneficial owners to vote.
255  While some brokers asked 
for additional copies for their customers, others did not and some simply voted their customers' shares 
for management.
256  Following the hesitating and drawn out process of discussion, study and debate 
that would become typical for attempts to facilitate shareholder voice,
257 the SEC issued Rule 14b-1 to 
ensure that brokers would act as intermediaries to deliver proxy materials to the shareholders who held 
shares through accounts with them,
258 and then, following enabling legislation from Congress,
259 the 
                                                                                                                                                 
252   Statues and court decisions effectively halted the takeover wave of the 1980's.  As Prof. Coffee 
observes: "The rate of takeovers and other acquisitions has declined significantly and continues to 
decline.  During the first quarter of 1991, merger and acquisition activity declined 18% over the 
corresponding quarter in the preceding year and hit an eleven year low.  See Mergers at an 11-year 
Low, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at D10.  The reasons for this decline are various: The drying up of 
the junk bond market; restrictive state antitakeover legislation, see infra note 5 and accompanying text, 
and judicial decisions that have accepted preemptive defensive tactics by target management.  See, e.g., 
Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). This decline  in takeover 
activity, particularly as a result of restrictive state legislation, has supplied the impetus, in my 
judgment, for scholars to consider the thesis that politics, more than economics, shaped the modern 
American corporation." Coffee, Liquidity vs. Control, supra note 2, at 1277, n. 1. 
253   For a discussion of shareholder voting and the use of proxy contests as a "political" model opposed to 
the "transaction" model of the market for corporate control, see Pound, supra note 21. 
254   222 F.Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
255   222 F.Supp. at 517-18. 
256   222 F.Supp. 518. 
257   See the historical description provided in  THOMAS & D IXON, supra note 16, at § 8.02[B]; J. Robert 
Brown, Jr., The Shareholder Communication Rules and the Securities and Exchange Commission: An 
Exercise in Regulatory Utility or Futility?, 13 J. CORP. L. 683 (1988), and Shaun M. Klein, Rule 14b-
2: Does it Actually Lead to the Prompt Forwarding of Communications to Beneficial Owners of 
Securities?, J. Corp. L. 155 (1997). 
258   17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1. See Proposed Rules: Facilitating Shareholder Communications, SEC Release 
Nos. 34-19291; 40-12866, 47 Fed. Reg. 5549126 (Dec. 10, 1982), and Final Rules: Facilitating 
Shareholder Communications Provisions, SEC Release Nos. 34-20021; 40-13408, 48 Fed. Reg. 35082 
(Aug. 3, 1983). 
259   See The Shareholders Communication Act of 1985, 99 Stat. 1737 (1985). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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SEC then issued an almost identical Rule 14b-2 imposing a similar duty on banks.
260  Now, a series of 
interlinking duties allow – albeit clumsily – proxy information and voting instructions to navigate their 
way through the pyramid structure of bank and broker holdings by requiring (i) an issuer to seek out 
numbers of beneficial owners from depositories and their participating banks and brokers,
261 and (ii) 
requiring both brokers and banks to supply accurate numbers and then forward materials received 
from the issuer.
262 
2. Softening the Overbroad Impact of Williams Act Rules 
As discussed above, the duty to file a Schedule 13D upon crossing the 5 % threshold singly or 
as part of a "group" both presents a significant obstacle to shareholder monitoring and does not always 
serve the legislative purpose of the Williams Act.
263  In 1978,
264 the SEC issued the significantly less 
intrusive Schedule 13G to allow institutional investors that "passively" invest in portfolio companies to 
file a significantly shorter form that was due originally and in updated forms within a much less 
pressing timeframe.  In 1989, the SEC proposed expanding the types of investors  that would be 
eligible to use Schedule 13G to include, "[i]n addition to the two current categories of Schedule 13G 
filers (institutional investors and persons reporting exempt acquisitions), a third category (passive non-
institutional investors)."
265  As is t ypical for measures attempting to facilitate shareholder voice, 
adoption was a long, halting process.  The amendments originally proposed in 1989 were put on ice, 
                                                 
260   17 C.F.R. § 240.14b–2. See Final Rules: Shareholder Communication Facilitation, SEC Release No. 
34-23847, 51 Fed. Reg. 44267 (Dec. 9, 1986); Proposed Rules: Facilitation of Shareholder 
Communications, SEC Release No. 34-24274, 52  Fed. Reg. 11083 (Apr. 7, 1987); Final Rules: 
Facilitating Shareholder Communications; Miscellaneous Amendments, SEC Release No. 34-24606, 
52  Fed. Reg. 23646 (June 24, 1987); Proposed Rules: Facilitating Shareholder Communications  -- 
Proposal Excluding Certain Employee Benefit Plan Participants From Application of the Proxy 
Processing and Direct Communications Provisions, SEC Release No. 34-24607, 52 Fed. Reg. 23855 
(June 25, 1987); Final  Rules: Facilitation of Shareholder Communications; Exclusion of Specified 
Employee Benefit Plan Participants From Application of the Proxy Processing and Direct 
Communications Provisions, SEC Release No. 34-25631, 53 Fed. Reg. 16399 (May 9, 1988). 
261   The duty of inquiry is imposed on registered issuers by Rule 14a-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-13, and the 
duty of depositories to provide a breakdown of participants who have the issuer's securities in their 
accounts is imposed by Rule 17Ad-8(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad–8(b). 
262   The relevant duty is imposed on brokers by Rule 14b-1, § 240.14b–1, which requires brokers or dealers 
to provide an issuer upon request with an accurate number of copies of proxy materials needed, and in 
a timely manner forward the proxy materials to their customer shareholders), and an almost identical 
duty is imposed on banks by Rule 14b-2, § 240.14b-2, with the exception that banks must also provide 
the issuer with prompt notice if they hold for correspondent banks, together with contact details for 
such banks.  Rules 14b-1 and -2 also allow brokers and banks to provide issuers with a list of the 
names and addresses of customers who do not object to having their names disclosed, but issuers may 
use this list only for distributing annual reports, not for proxy materials. 
263   See Part III.B.1. 
264   See Schedule 13G Adopting Release, supra note 149. 
265   See Notice of proposed rulemaking: Reporting of Beneficial Ownership in Publicly-Held Companies, 
SEC Release No. 34-26598, 54 Fed. Reg. 10552 (Mar. 14, 1989). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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then re-proposed in 1996,
266 and adopted only two years later in 1998.
267  As discussed in Part III.B.1 
of this paper, work is still necessary to ensure  that the definitions of the type of "group" that will 
trigger a disclosure obligation and the type of "disqualifying activity" that would prevent a shareholder 
from filing a Schedule 13G are not so broad as to frustrate and chill valuable shareholder monitoring. 
3. Requiring Prudent Exercise of Voting Rights 
With a growing presence of institutional share ownership, conflicts of interest between an 
institution's exercise of the votes from its beneficiaries' shares and its other business dealings with 
portfolio companies intensified.
268  In its 1971 study of institutional investors, the SEC found that 
many preferred to support management or quietly exit rather than exercise meddling voice, and this 
tendency became known as the "Wall Street Rule."
269  Few economic or legal incentives existed to 
counter this tendency.
270  As ERISA
271 Administrator of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) in the 
1980's Robert Monks advocated the position that "casting a ballot . . . with an eye toward one's 
banking relationships rather than to the intrinsic merits of the measure, clearly violates ERISA."
272  A 
report by Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS), which Mr. Monks established in 1984, found 
that portfolio companies could place institutions under pressure to support management policies in part 
because "the current regulatory structure gives investment managers no incentives to vote 
independently."
273  In 1988, the DOL issued a letter to Board Avon Products, Inc., explaining its 
position that because "the decision as to how proxies should be voted . . . are fiduciary acts of plan 
asset management," voting decisions fall under the requirement in § 404(a)(1) ERISA "that a fiduciary 
of a plan act prudently, solely in the interest of the plan's participants and beneficiaries, and for the 
                                                 
266   See Reproposed rules: Amendments to Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements, SEC Release 
No. 34-37403, 61 Fed. Reg. 36521 (July 11, 1996). 
267   See Schedule 13G Amending Release, supra note 150. 
268   JAMES E. HEARD & H OWARD D. SHEARMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING SYSTEM 
40-49 (1987). 
269   The "Institutional Investor Study Report" described the "Wall Street rule" as follows:  "[I]nstitutions 
tend to vote with management on questions put to a shareholder vote and . . . if they lose confidence in 
management they tend to sell their holdings in a company rather then to attempt to control or influence 
management decisions. This conclusion appears attributable to two factors. First, institutions are 
inclined to believe that their responsibility is to make investment decisions rather than to attempt to 
influence management decisions. Second, while there are no statutory restrictions upon the right of 
institutions to attempt to influence management decisions, institutions tend to believe that an effort to 
do so would be inappropriate and would subject them to criticism. . . . In general, it can be concluded 
that even where institutions have the potential power to influence management decisions they tend to 
be reluctant to exercise this power, particularly in an open and public way." Quoted in HEARD & 
SHEARMAN, Id. at 40. 
270   See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 
Geo. L.J. 445, 476 (1991). 
271   The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-2008 (2000). 
272   See HEARD & SHERMAN, supra note 268, at 32. 
273   Quoted in HEARD & SHEARMAN, supra note 268, at 49. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries."
274  In 1994, the DOL 
codified this duty for application to all plans (i.e., private pension funds) subject to ERISA.
275  This 
extension of fiduciary duty to the exercise voting rights encourages institutional investors to advocate 
the interests of their beneficiaries though voting rights despite threatened reprisals from the 
management of the portfolio companies.  This duty is reinforced by a requirement that the trustee, or 
investment manager, as the case may be, formulate a "statement of proxy voting policy" and maintain 
written records of its votes cast.
276  The DOL Interpretive Bulletin also explicitly condones "active" 
shareholder monitoring.
277  Although ERISA does not apply to shareholders other than private pension 
funds, many state governments followed the DOL's lead in providing similar duties for state and local 
pension funds.
278  In 2003, the SEC issued rules to require investment companies to publish their 
voting policies and their voting records,
279 and to require investment advisers to adopt written policies 
and procedures designed to ensure that client securities are voted in the best interest of clients, provide 
clients with information on such policies and procedures, and upon request inform them of how votes 
were actually cast.
280  In this way, during a period of about two decades, duties have been applied to 
most institutional investors on the U.S. market to either directly require or indirectly encourage them to 
exercise their voting rights according to a prudent business policy in the best interests of their 
beneficiaries. 
4. Creating Independent Proxy Advice Organizations 
Another step that has been crucial in the rise of shareholder voice was an initial reduction of 
collective action costs.  Nonaffiliated organizations have sprung up in recent decades to analyze 
corporate governance mechanisms and the performance and proxy materials of listed companies, and 
then make their findings available to their clients or to the market as a whole.  One such proxy advice 
organization is ISS, which describes its "core business" as "analyzing proxies and issuing informed 
                                                 
274   Labor Department Letter to Avon Products, Inc. on Proxy Voting by Plan Fiduciaries, 15 Pens. Rep. 
(BNA) 391 n.4 (Feb. 29, 1988). 
275   DOL Interpretive bulletin relating to written statements of investment policy, including proxy voting 
policy or guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94–2 (2004). 
276   Id., at (1) Proxy Voting and (2) Statements of Investment Policy. 
277   Id., at (3) Shareholder Activism.  This section provides:  "An investment policy that contemplates 
activities intended to monitor or influence the management of corporations in which the plan owns 
stock is consistent with a fiduciary’s obligations under ERISA where the responsible fiduciary 
concludes that there is a reasonable expectation that such monitoring or communication with 
management, by the plan alone or together with other shareholders, is likely to enhance the value of 
the plan’s investment in the corporation, after taking into account the costs involved." 
278   THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 16, at § 1.01[C]. 
279   Final Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management 
Investment Companies, SEC Release Nr. 33–8188, 34–47304, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003). 
280   Final Rule: Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, SEC Release Nr. IA–2106, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Feb. 
7, 2003). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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research and objective vote recommendations for more than 28,000 companies across 115 markets 
worldwide."
281  Another is the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which describes its 
activities as "proxy research and analysis, benchmarking products, as well as proxy voting services to 
more than 500 institutional investors, corporations, law firms, foundations, academics and other 
organizations."
282  These organizations spread many of the costs of shareholder monitoring widely 
throughout the market, thus reducing collective action problems, such as the free riding, that impede 
active monitoring.  They can also serve as shields for publicity shy shareholders by taking much of the 
political "heat" for active monitoring.
283  Large, public funds, like Calpers also provide a similar public 
good to the market.
284  Recalling the analogy to political democracy, these institutions gather, digest 
and publish information and opinions on information much like the media does for citizens who have 
neither the time nor the means to visit state and national legislatures and analyze the raw data they 
need to make their voting decisions.  Of course, like the media, these organizations are sometimes 
criticized for being too influential.
285  It might be expected that the market will provide various types of 
proxy advice organizations to match variations in viewpoints among investors.  The arrival of the 
internet in the mid-1990's further facilitated the publication of information and opinions on shareholder 
action and lowered the costs of communication between s hareholders.  The SEC reacted to these 
developments with admirable speed by issuing interpretive guidance in 1995 that embraced the 
electronic delivery of required communications.
286 
5. Allowing Reasonable Shareholder Communications 
The ability of proxy advice organizations to publish information and recommendations in 
connection with the exercise of voting rights was greatly facilitated by changes to the proxy rules made 
in 1992.
287  These amendments are noteworthy because they were sought and obtained by the growing 
shareholders  lobby,
288 despite a furious battle by management to prevent their adoption.
289  The 
                                                 
281   See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, at http://www.issproxy.com/about/index.jsp. 
282   See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, at http://www.irrc.org/. 
283   See Coffee, Liquidity vs. Control, supra note 2, at  
284   See supra note 249, and accompanying text. 
285   See the Steven A. Rosenblum's criticism of the influence wielded by ISS, cited in supra note 17. 
286   SEC Interpretive Release: Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes; Action: Interpretation; 
Solicitation of comment. 17 C.F.R. Parts 231, 241 and 271, Release No. 33-7233 (Oct. 6, 1995). 
287   See Final Rules: Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, SEC Release No. 34-31326, 57 
Fed. Reg. 48276 (Oct. 22, 1992) ("Shareholder Communications Release"). 
288   See THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 16, at § 8.02, and Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 18, at 837-
41. 
289   Prof. Coffee phrased it thus: "Nothing that the [SEC] has done in recent years has been as controversial 
or significant as its efforts to reform the proxy rules to permit greater communication among 
shareholders. . . ." Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 18, at 837.  Prof. Fisch described the adoption 
of the amendments as follows: "On October 16, 1992, after a comprehensive review of its system of 
proxy regulation and after two separate amendment proposals that drew more than 1700 letters of Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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amendments carved out  an exclusion from the broad definition of regulated proxy "solicitation",
290 
which had chilled communications among shareholders,
291 to a llow a shareholder to publicly 
announcements how he intends to vote and why.
292  This exclusion, combined with the advent of the 
internet, helped to significantly reduce shareholder isolation.  An exemption from the category of proxy 
solicitation  was made  also  to allow  free discussion with shareholders on  issues related to voting, 
provided no proxy authority is sought, there is no substantial interest in the matter subject to vote, and 
the person initiating the discussion does not have a disqualifying characteristic (such as having to file a 
Schedule 13D).
293  Other amendments reduced the time and resources necessary for conducting proxy 
solicitations subject to filing with the SEC.
294  The requirements for the proxy form were changed to 
prevent management from linking together proposals against shareholders' interests (such as a by-law 
amendment limiting shareholder rights) with a "sweetener" (such as an extraordinary distribution of 
cash to shareholders);
295 now each proposal must be separately listed.
296  It was also made possible for 
challenging shareholders who launch a proxy contest to "round out" their ballot with consenting 
management directors, provided that the names of the management directors do not appear on the 
challenger's form of proxy.
297 
6. The Unhappy Path of Rule 14a-8 
The evolution of Rule 14a-8 since its inception in 1943 has been less encouraging.  As Prof. 
Fisch explains in her historical analysis of the Rule, the SEC originally intended it simply to implement 
the rights that shareholders enjoyed under state law.
298  However, as a lack of clearly articulated state 
                                                                                                                                                 
comment from the public, the [SEC] voted to reform the federal proxy rules." Fisch, supra note 222, at 
1129-30. 
290   See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l) for the current definition of solicitation. 
291   See THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 16, at § 1.01[E]; LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at § 6-C-2.b.  
The SEC explained: "The amendments eliminate unnecessary regulatory obstacles to the exchange of 
views and opinions by shareholders and others concerning management performance and initiatives 
presented for a vote of shareholders." Shareholder Communications Release, supra note 286, at 48276. 
292   17 C.F.R. §   240.14a-1(l)(2)(iv).  See  Shareholder Communications Release,  supra  note 286, 
Introduction. 
293   17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b). See Shareholder Communications Release, supra note 286, at II.A1. 
294   Rule 14a-3 was amended to allow proxies to be solicited by public broadcast, speech or publication 
without delivering a proxy statement to the audience, provided a definitive proxy statement is on file 
with the SEC. Rules 14a-3(a) and 14a-4 were amended to allow proxy solicitation to commence on the 
basis of a preliminary proxy statement filed with the SEC, as long as a form of proxy is not provided 
until the definitive proxy statement is delivered. Rule 14a-6 was amended to allow solicitation 
materials other than the proxy statement and form of proxy to be filed with the Commission in 
definitive form at the time of dissemination.  See Shareholder Communications Release, supra note 
286, at II.C and D. 
295   See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1327. 
296   17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a), (b)(1). See Shareholder Communications Release, supra note 286, at II.H. 
297   17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d). See Shareholder Communications Release, supra note 286, at II.I. 
298   Fisch, supra note 222, at 1144. Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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rules on shareholder proposals led to litigation such as the 1947 Third Circuit case of  SEC v. 
Transamerica Corp.,
299 the SEC began to specify qualifications and grounds for management 
exclusion under the Rule until an impressive 13 such grounds have now accumulated.
300  In stenciling 
out the matters permissible for shareholder proposals against the wide open rights of shareholders at 
annual meetings under state law, Rule 14a-8  distorted  the (state law) balance of power between 
shareholders and management.
301  This has already been discussed in detail above.
302 
Beyond the over-breadth of the specific exclusions, the manner in which the SEC has interpreted 
vague terms like "ordinary business operations" has also worked to shareholders' disadvantage.  It has 
been the norm that a matter could be considered "ordinary" until it causes enough damage to gain a 
prominent place in the media.  For example, despite a Congressional intent at the time of the Exchange 
Act to address excessive executive compensation, the SEC allowed proposals regarding compensation 
to be excluded as affecting "ordinary business operations" until the issue caused enough controversy to 
enter into widespread public debate, and then denied their exclusion.
303  Similarly, shareholder 
initiatives on auditor independences had to follow, rather than anticipate, newsworthy problems.
304  In 
December 2002, as public interest in the question of expensing stock options reached a high point, the 
SEC reversed an earlier position that allowed exclusion of proposals regarding this issue.
305  This case 
is particularly egregious in light of the then SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt's failed attempt in 1993 to 
support an accounting standard that would have required the expensing of stock options,
306  which 
                                                 
299   163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947). 
300   See  17 C.F.R. §  240.14a-8.  In addition to eligibility requirements and procedural requirements to 
qualify for submission, a proposal may be excluded if (1) it is not a proper subject for action by 
shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company’s organization; (2) if implemented, it 
would cause the company to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject; (3) it or its 
supporting statement is contrary to an SEC proxy rules, including Rule 14a-9, prohibiting materially 
false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials; (4) it relates to the redress of a personal 
claim or grievance against the company or any other person, or seeks a personal benefit; (5) it relates to 
operations which account for less than 5% of the company’s total assets and for less than 5% of its net 
earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not otherwise significantly related to the 
company’s business; (6) the company would lack the power or authority to implement it; (7) it deals 
with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations; (8) it relates to an election for 
membership on the company’s board of directors or analogous governing body; (9) it directly conflicts 
with one of the company’s own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting; (10) the 
company has already substantially implemented the proposal; (11) it substantially duplicates another 
proposal previously submitted that will be included in the proxy materials; (12) it deals with 
substantially the same subject matter as another proposal that has been previously included in the proxy 
materials in the past 5 years and has received little support; or (13) it relates to specific amounts of 
cash or stock dividends. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i). 
301   Fisch, supra note 222, at 1151. 
302   See Part IV.B. 
303   Fisch, supra note 222, at 1158-59. 
304   See Quinn, supra note 188, at 29. 
305   Id. at 30. 
306   See AURTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 26-27 (2002). Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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would seem to indicate that he deemed the matter extra-ordinary.  The governance benefit of privately 
owned organizations with "representative democratic" structures is precisely to allow  ideas for 
desirable change to flow from the grass roots when it cannot be imposed centrally – such as by the 
SEC – which makes the SEC's "wait and see" policy particularly troubling.  It is difficult to deny Prof. 
Fisch's argument that this policy frustrates the valuable, innovative potential of shareholders, "to 
anticipate and to initiate public debate, instead of awaiting SEC staff recognition that the issues have 
developed into a significant policy matter."
307  Tethering shareholder voice behind broad, public 
opinion is also a likely cause of some of today's shareholder apathy and has perhaps contributed to the 
"heard aspect" of similar proposals flooding into management as soon as the media certifies that the 
matter has indeed entered "widespread public debate." 
7. Eliminating the Carrot of "Soft Information" 
Another positive development for shareholder monitoring came in 2000, when the SEC adopted 
Regulation FD.
308  Regulation FD requires that any material non-public information disclosed to 
specified persons (including investment managers), not acting in a fiduciary capacity or under a 
confidentiality agreement, also be disclosed simultaneously (if  the disclosure was  intentional) or 
promptly (if unintentional) to the public.
309  Prior to this rule, as Prof. Coffee explained, "[i]nstitutional 
investors who oppose[d] management risk[ed] cutting themselves off from the flow of soft information 
that management provides to 'friendly' securities analysts and institutions."
310  Thus, while the DOL's 
administration of ERISA and the similar rules that followed suit gave institutions reason to exercise 
voice, Regulation FD removed a lever that portfolio companies could use to punish them for such 
exercise. 
8. One Small Step Towards Shareholders Actually Electing Directors 
Part IV of this paper showed how electing directors by "plurality" vote means electing whoever 
is on the list of nominees, and that although state law permits shareholders to nominate candidates for 
the board, federal law blocks that right by excluding shareholder nominees from the proxy statement 
and shareholder proposals.  This frustration of the shareholders' right to actually elect directors is a 
fundamental weakness of the default governance structures found in U.S. corporate statutes.  In 2003, 
the SEC issued rules to increase the independence of board nominating committees and the disclosure 
of their procedures.
311  A Schedule 14A must now state whether the committee considers candidates 
                                                 
307   Fisch, supra note 222, at 1162. 
308   17 C.F.R. § 243.100 
309   See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) and (b). 
310   Coffee, Liquidity vs. Control, supra note 2, at 1323. 
311   See Final Rule: Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications 
Between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, SEC Release Nos. 33–8340; 34–48825, 68 Fed. 
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recommended by shareholders and name any such candidate recommended by a major shareholder who 
was rejected.
312  The complex requirements of the provision aim to create a neutral nominating 
committee within the board to address shareholder concerns about the board's accountability.  This 
use of complex independence and disclosure requirements to create carefully vetted trustees charged 
with caring for shareholder interests – as opposed to giving shareholders a voice to speak up for their 
own interests – is what a recent study has called the "trusteeship strategy," which is to be distinguished 
from the "decision rights strategy", which gives shareholders influence through direct vote.
313  As 
discussed in detail above, the opponents of shareholder voice distrust structures giving shareholders 
decision rights, and instead place more confidence in structures that give management paternal powers 
to protect shareholders from themselves.
314  As seen from the way that this rule glided to adoption 
without much discussion  – in comparison to the bitterly debated shareholder nominations rule, 
discussed below  – we can understand why the SEC may wish to make the use of independent 
committees as a safe compromise when addressing shareholder rights. 
Nevertheless, in 2003 the SEC also proposed a new Rule 14a-11,
315 which would employ a 
qualified "decision rights strategy" by allowing shareholders to nominate candidates for election to the 
                                                 
312   Item 7 of Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–101 now contains a "comply or explain" duty under 
which a registrant company must state in its proxy statement whether it has undertaken a number of 
acts and if not, explain why.  Disclosures include the presence of a nominating committee (describing 
its composition and whether its charter has been posted on the company's website), whether its 
members are independent, whether it has a policy for considering shareholder nominees (describing its 
material elements and the procedure), any specific minimum requirements for a board candidate, the 
process used to evaluate candidates, the origin of the candidates recently included on the proxy card, 
any service used to evaluate candidates, any candidate nominated in a timely manner by a 5 %, one-
year shareholder or group of shareholders who was not included on the card (provided the shareholder 
and the rejected candidate consent to disclosure). 
313   See KRAAKMAN ET AL., ANATOMY, supra note 42, at 46-51. 
314   This is certainly the case with the preferred method of creating independent directors to act in a 
tutelary fashion for shareholders on the board rather than making directors accountable to shareholders 
for their appointments.  This faith in the trustee strategy is evidenced by recourse to independent 
directors in § 10A(m)(3)(A) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by § 301 of the ‘Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 ("Each member of the audit committee of the 
issuer shall be a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be independent.").  
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has explained the utility of this requirement as follows:  
"Management may face market pressures for short-term performance and corresponding pressures to 
satisfy market expectations. . . . An independent audit committee with adequate resources helps to 
overcome this problem and to align corporate interests with those of shareholders."  Final Rule: 
Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, SEC Release Nos. 33–8220; 34–47654, 68 
Fed. Reg. 18788, 18790-91 (Apr. 16, 2003).  For an older formulation of a similar requirement,  see 
THE  AMERICAN  LAW  INSTITUTE,  supra  note 101, at §   3A.01: "It is recommended as a matter of 
corporate practice that (a) the board of every large publicly held corporation [§ 1.24] should have a 
majority of directors who are free of any significant relationship [§ 1.34] with the corporation's senior 
executives . . . .".  Robert Monks describes the attitude of trusting wise (disinterested, independent, 
prudent) managers to care for shareholders, rather than allowing shareholders to speak for themselves, 
a yearning for the "benevolent dictatorship" of the "philosopher king".  See MONKS, supra note 239, at 
112-14. 
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board.  As the SEC explained in its proposing release, it had considered allowing shareholder 
nominations on proxy materials in 1977, but due to the "emerging concept of nominating committees," 
decided to wait and monitor the situation; in 2003, the SEC observed that, "it appears that the presence 
of nominating committees has not eliminated the concerns among some security holders with regard to 
the barriers to meaningful participation in the proxy process in connection with the nomination and 
election of directors."
316  However, the proposed rule for shareholder nominations was very limited.  It 
would apply to registered companies only under specified conditions,
317 and allow only certain 
shareholders
318 to nominate a small minority
319 of the candidates for the board.  The advantage would 
be inclusion of the nominee in the company's proxy materials, as opposed to having to run and pay for 
a proxy contest.  Detailed independence requirements were included to appease the fear that, even if 
elected by a majority of the shareholders, the nominee if elected would be a special interest director.
320  
The proposed rule's triggering and holding requirements, as well as the small number of candidate slots 
it allows, makes it a less than perfect tool for shareholder voice in today's economy.  The odd, indirect 
triggering by withhold votes is particularly troubling because it both tacks a secondary (federal) 
significance on a (state law) vote for directors and, as a matter of policy, seems to express distrust in 
shareholders' ability simply to express their own choice to apply the rule.
321 
                                                 
316   Security Holder Nominations Proposal, supra note 152, at 60785-86. 
317   The mechanism of the proposed rule would be applicable under two conditions.  First, shareholders 
could simply opt in to its application by voting to do so. See Security Holder Nominations Proposal, 
supra note 152, at 60819.  The second trigger would be if "[a]t least one of the registrant’s nominees 
for the board of directors for whom the registrant solicited proxies received 'withhold' votes from more 
than 35% of the votes cast at an annual meeting of security holders," except in the case of a contested 
election. Id. 
318   A nominating shareholder or shareholder group would have to have held more than 5% of the 
registrant's securities that are "eligible to vote for the election of directors" continuously for at least two 
years and intend to continue to hold those securities through the date of the subject election of 
directors. See Security Holder Nominations Proposal, supra note 152, at 60820. 
319   One nominee would be permitted in a board of up to eight members, two nominees in a board of 
between nine and 19 members, and three nominees in a board of 20 or more members.  See Security 
Holder Nominations Proposal, supra note 152, at 60822. 
320   The independence requirement resembles existing, similar requirements for all independent board 
members, but is focused on guarding against ties specifically between the nominee and the nominating 
shareholder or group of shareholders.  It prohibits the nominee from being first, the nominating 
shareholder or a member of the nominating group, second, an employee of the nominating shareholder 
or any group member, third, a recipient of fees from the nominating shareholder or group member, 
fourth, an executive officer or director of the nominating shareholder or any group member, fifth, 
neither controlling nor controlled by the nominating shareholder or any group member, and sixth, in 
compliance with the applicable independence requirements for directors under the relevant stock 
exchange rules. See Security Holder Nominations Proposal, supra note 152, at 60820-21. 
321   The blind triggering event of a 35% withhold vote (see supra note 317) would ascribe a secondary 
meaning to votes that shareholders  intend  to cast in favor of or withhold from the election of a 
particular director, ascribing a symbolic value to a totally different action, and treating shareholders as 
a group that cannot think and act for itself.  This blind trigger would also interfere with the exercise of 
a state law right.  As Prof. John Coffee has remarked, this secondary meaning would "skew" (distort) Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents 
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Like the proposed rules that were eventually adopted in 1992, the Security Holder Nominations 
Proposal was immediately subject to a withering assault by its opponents.  In the words of Georgeson 
Shareholder, "the proposal evoked bitter controversy, inspired an estimated 16,000 comment letters 
and divided the Commission."
322  According to a report prepared by the organization, Public Citizens 
Congress Watch, the Business Roundtable led a costly and widespread lobby against the rule that 
targeted not only the SEC, but also the Congress, the White House, and the Departments of Treasury 
and of Commerce.
323  The resulting siege on the SEC brought the Wall Street Journal to remark: "At a 
time when President George W. Bush was putting the U.S. military behind democracy in Iraq, the SEC 
chairman was backing a baby step toward democracy in the boardroom. . . . Since then, however, [the 
SEC Chairman,] Mr. Donaldson has been in retreat."
324  On June 1, 2005, SEC Chairman Donaldson 
announced that he would resign his office effective June 30.
325  Regardless of the outcome of the very 
limited rule set forth in the Security Holders Nominations Proposal, the proposal and the attention it 
focused on the problem rule has already had a significant effect.  Both ISS and Georgeson Shareholder 
observed in the reports on the 2004 proxy season that the "informal" negotiations between management 
and shareholders that take place against the backdrop of the legal rights of each party were more 
vigorous and – according to ISS – more civil, than in past proxy seasons.
326  Thus even the proposal of 
the rule marked some progress.  As discussed above in Part V.B.6, if the existing block  to a 
shareholder's nomination rights under state law is to be removed, it may perhaps more effectively be 
accomplished in Rule 14a-8. 
Given the steady growth of sophisticated investors on the U.S. market, the increasing access to 
well-organized information and the overall impact of information technology on collective action, it 
would seem probable that open exercise of shareholder voice will continue to gain support until an 
effective system of communication and influence is achieved.  One argument against this position is the 
opinion that most institutional shareholders are not interested in committing significant funds to 
                                                                                                                                                 
the vote on the principal issue of the resolution.  See  Remarks of Prof. John C. Coffee, Jr., in 
"Symposium on Corporate Elections", supra note 209, at 98-99. 
322   GEORGESON SHAREHOLDER, 2004 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW i (2004). 
323   PUBLIC  CITIZEN, C ORPORATE  CRONIES: H OW THE  BUSH  ADMINISTRATION  HAS  STALLED A  MAJOR 
CORPORATE  REFORM AND  PLACED THE  INTERESTS OF  CORPORATE  DONORS OVER THE  NATION’S 
INVESTORS 11-13 (October 2004). 
324   Alan Murray, Shareholders Lose an Advocate at the SEC, Wall St. J. Europe, Mar. 23, 2005, at A2. 
325   See Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson 
to Step Down on June 30 (June 1, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-82.htm. 
326   "To an impressive degree, constructive dialogue between shareholders and corporations replaced 
confrontation. The action took place off stage, the results out of the limelight. But evidence suggests 
that the consequences were real—and to the mutual benefit of both corporations and institutional 
investors." INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 210, at 3, and "Like the proverbial 
elephant in the drawing room, the access rule was an unacknowledged but powerful factor influencing 
the mood and behavior of companies and  shareholders at 2004 annual meetings."  GEORGESON 
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corporate governance measures or giving their competitors a free ride on the improvements such 
measures bring.  The availability of cost-spreading proxy organizations and the steadily decreasing 
costs of  information and communication  would seem to speak against this argument.  Another 
argument is found in the intensity of the corporate lobby against any improvements in the proxy 
system.  This argument would seem to be bolstered by the trench warfare that explodes whenever an 
increase in shareholder voice is proposed.  However, the corporate lobby is being countered by an 
increasingly organized institutional shareholder lobby, and it appears that the economic trend toward 
mediated investment would serve to increase the strength of the latter group.  Certainly, if shareholder 
voice does become a viable option to exit, newly "empowered" shareholders will have to be subjected 
to fitting duties. 
C. Conclusion 
This paper has  shown that some of the principal arguments against shareholder voice are 
unfounded.  It has shown that shareholders do own corporations, and that the nature of their property 
interest is structured to meet the needs of the relationships found in stock corporations.  The paper has 
explained that fiduciary and other duties restrain the actions of shareholders just as they do those of 
management, and that critics cannot reasonably expect court-imposed fiduciary duties to extend 
beyond the actual powers of shareholders.  It has also illustrated how, although corporate statutes give 
shareholders complete power to structure governance as they will, the default governance structures of 
U.S. corporations leaves shareholders almost powerless to initiate any sort of action, and the 
interaction between state and federal law makes it almost impossible for shareholders to elect directors 
of their choice.  Lastly, the paper has recalled how the percentage of U.S. corporate equities owned by 
institutional investors has increased dramatically in recent decades, and it has outlined some of the 
major developments in shareholder rights that followed this increase.  I hope that this paper deflated 
some of the strong rhetoric used against shareholder voice by contrasting rhetoric to law, and that it 
illustrated why the picture of weak owners painted in the early 20
th century should be updated to new 
circumstances, which will help avoid projecting an old description as a current normative model that 
perpetuates the inevitability of "managerialsm", perhaps better known as "dirigisme". I 
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